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Why do some states escalate territorial disputes while other states ignore or actively 
resolve their territorial claims? Why do some states choose to diplomatically close their 
borders with a neighboring state, or to build a physical fence? Some states unilaterally close 
and reopen their borders multiple times during conflicts. Why do they pursue what appears on 
its face to be an inconsistent border management strategy? This dissertation addresses these 
questions.  
The first essay argues that differing domestic intuitions cause some states to view 
territorial conflict as either more or less threatening overall. A large-N analysis of all 
territorial disputes between 1945 and 2007 reveals that military regimes are especially likely 
to escalate territorial disputes, while personalist dictators are unwilling to do so for fear of 
emboldening coup-plotters.  
The second essay analyzes all border closures and border fence construction between 
1980 and 2011. It employs an original dataset and large-N analysis to demonstrate that, 
contrary to previous research, civil wars cause states to alter their border management 
techniques. It further provides a unified theory explaining why states pursue short term 
strategies like border closures when faced with some threats, and build physical fences when 
confronted by longer term challenges.  
The final paper observes that diplomatic border closures are especially likely during 
civil wars, and analyzes the border opening and closing behaviors of neighboring states 
  
during these conflicts. It presents a game theoretic model to illustrate that this pattern of 
intermittent closure and opening occurs when a refugee-receiving state attempts to extort 
additional international aid from the international community by endangering refugees. It then 
analyzes the implications of these models on two cases: Tanzania during the 
Burundi/Rwandan conflict and Macedonia during the Kosovo war.  
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PAPER 1 
 
BORDERING AUTOCRATS: 
MILTERIZED DISPUTES, TERRITORY, AND AUTOCRAT REGIME TYPE 
Introduction 
 
 Which regime type is the most belligerent? A diverse literature points to the relative 
peacefulness of democracies. However, the field has no consensus on which type of regime 
produces the most violence internationally. A growing line of inquiry notes that variations of 
autocracies resort to war at differing rates. But this literature is deeply divided over which 
internal political structures lead to more conflict. One side focuses on personalist dictatorships 
as the predominant source of conflict. They argue that dictators like Idi Amin and Saddam 
Hussein have few constraints preventing them from attacking other states. Others attribute 
militarized disputes to the bellicosity of military regimes. These scholars point to the presence 
of unchecked military institutions in juntas like Argentina and Cyprus to explain the Falklands 
War and Cyprus Dispute, among others.  
 I argue that different regime types escalate conflicts at varying rates according to each 
conflict’s central issue. Focusing on territorial claims, I hypothesize that military regimes have 
unique incentives which drive them to fight more border wars. Terrestrial warfare requires 
strong, professional armies and gives juntas an opportunity to reward their core supporters 
while fighting conflicts with relatively clear military objectives. Moreover, territorial claims 
challenge the identity of military elites as defenders of the national honor. Therefore, leading 
generals have a vested ideological reason for their high sensitivity to territorial disputes. 
Conversely, strong militaries threaten the regime survival of personalist dictators. These 
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autocrats are thus unlikely to engage in conflicts which necessitate building up the armed forces 
because the largest threat to their power is the possibility of a coup. However, these incentives 
may flip when autocrats have disagreements over other issues (Way and Weeks, 2014).  
If the issue underpinning a dispute differentially structures regimes’ incentives to adopt 
force, findings which point to the belligerency of personalists and governing generals may both 
be correct. Rather than continuing the debate on whether juntas or dictators are the most 
warlike, my study of the conflict propensity of different regime types engaged in a territorial 
dispute points to a more productive avenue of research for the study of international conflict 
and autocracy. Adopting an issue areas approach, as has been commonly advocated by 
researchers of territorial conflict, will add nuance to the field’s understanding of variation in the 
use of violence over regime type. Moreover, it will help explain why belligerent regimes 
choose the fights they do.   
This essay consists of four parts. I review the debate over which autocrats use the most 
force, and discuss the issue areas approach to analyzing conflict. Next, I outline a theoretical 
explanation linking types of autocracy to differing sensitivity to territorial dispute. I then model 
the conflict propensity of all directed-dyads between 1945 and 2007 to test for an interaction 
effect between regime type and the existence of a territorial dispute. I find that military 
dictatorships have heightened sensitivity to existing territorial disputes and are thus the most 
likely to escalate these conflicts. In my final section, I address these policy concerns, and 
discuss how future research examining the interaction between autocracy and other forms of 
dispute may further advance our understanding of international conflict.  
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State of the Literature 
Regime Type and Militarized Disputes 
 
 While International Relations is just beginning to examine which regime types are the 
most belligerent, near universal agreement exists over which regime type is the most peaceful. 
The field treats democracies as singularly pacific governments. The democratic peace findings 
are so stable that Jack Levy famously noted that the “absence of war between democracies 
comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations” (1989,88). 
No law like formulation exists for predicting whether autocracies will militarize or negotiate a 
disagreement.  
One set of findings argues that personalist regimes destabilize international peace more 
than other regimes. Weeks and her co-authors observe a pattern of personalists 
disproportionately fueling violent international confrontations (Weeks 2008; Weeks 2012). In 
addition to explaining the escalation of most MIDs, personalists also explain the link between 
revolution and interstate conflict (Colgan and Weeks 2014; Walt 1992). Moreover, personalists 
disproportionately seek to proliferate weapons of mass destruction as a method for increasing 
their fighting efficacy without empowering their generals and admirals (Way and Weeks 2014).  
Examination of mixed regime dyads further points to the bellicosity of personalists. 
Reiter and Stam find that personalists are significantly more likely to initiate an attack on a 
democracy, despite having a low probability of winning these confrontations (2003). Mixed 
evidence suggests that personalists preferentially target single party regimes (Peceny and Beer 
2003). 
 Other scholars contend that military regimes account for most armed confrontations. Lai 
and Slater argue that the relationship between personalization of autocracy and belligerency is 
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spurious (2006). Their data suggests that authoritarian governments with strong and politicized 
militaries are more likely to initiate conflict. However, Lai and Slater focus on formal 
institutions. Autocratic regimes frequently feature informal political levers that impact their 
likelihood of engaging in conflict (Weeks 2012). Likewise, Sechser finds that states which 
deemphasize civilian control over the military resort to force more often (2004). A military 
background also predicts that a leader will initiate armed confrontations with others (Horowitz 
and Stam 2014). This pattern is even stronger in regimes lacking robust civilian control over 
the armed forces.  
 Both sides of the debate within the authoritarian conflict research agenda examine 
aggregate levels of militarization. These studies frequently analyze all MIDs or directed-dyadic 
MIDs within a particular period. Focusing exclusively on the level of hostilities achieved in a 
MID skims over the fact that disputes emerge over a variety of issues. Within some 
confrontations, states disagree over economics or policy. For example, the Football War broke 
out between Honduras and El Salvador due to contention over immigration. Likewise, Britain 
waged a transnational battle on the high seas to end the slave trade. Other MIDs develop over 
territorial questions.  
 Instigations aside, certain regimes might also be more common targets in conflicts than 
others. Intervention to change the regime type of an opposing state has driven conflict 
historically. For instance, the United States mobilized its armed forces during Operation 
Uphold Democracy to reestablish democracy within Haiti by ousting General Raoul Cedras, 
who had come to power in a widely condemned coup. Similarly, North and South Korea have 
come to loggerheads many times over regime differences. Treating these disputes as equivalent 
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artificially homogenizes conflicts that governments may have different incentives to handle at 
the negotiating table or on the battlefield.  
Issues Approach to Analyzing Conflict 
 
By recognizing that disputes have heterogeneous origins, the literature on autocratic 
conflict propensity can synthesize its apparently conflicting findings. Instead of debating which 
autocrats make the worst neighbors, the field should examine autocratic bellicosity within 
rather than across issues. For example, personalist regimes may be the most bellicose regime 
when confronted with one issue area, while military regimes may find another issue areas 
especially sensitive. Adopting an issue area approach allows scholars to explain why both 
regime types can prefer violent armed confrontations. As an added benefit, this approach also 
encourages research into more nuanced questions, such as, “when will a regime type be mostly 
like to fight?” This essay takes the first step in synthesizing regime-based scholarship and issue 
area approaches by examining the how sensitive autocratic regimes are to existing territorial 
disputes.  
 The core tenant of an issues-based approach is that practical questions ground leaders’ 
foreign affairs (Hensel et al. 2008; Hensel 2001; Vasquez 1993; Diehl 1992; Mansbach and 
Vasquez 1981; Keohane and Nye 1977; O’Leary 1976). International Relations theory 
generally emphasizes abstract concepts like power and national interest when explaining 
international outcomes, but Holsti critiques this focus. He writes, “Nowhere do we find the 
issues that excite men’s passions and fears, those stakes that predispose them to take up arms to 
pursue or defend their causes and purposes…to leave out issues is to leave out the stuff of 
politics,” (1991, 12). Presidents and dictators alike may want to pursue vague notions like 
security, but most rulers spend their time addressing specific policy questions. How can my 
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state fortify its largest riparian border in light of the river shifting channels? How can my state 
improve its trade balance with country B if they continue to pursue a policy of artificially 
devaluing their currency? What actions can my state take to prevent foreign sponsored civil 
society organizations from forming domestically? Foreign policy is, in practice, a portfolio of 
answers to these and many other questions faced by governing elites (Mitchell and Hensel 
2007). 
 If issues are the stuff of international politics, what exactly constitutes an issue and 
when do issues matter? Robert Randle defines an issue as “a disputed point or question, the 
subject of a conflict or controversy” (1987, 1). Issues take a variety of forms. States can 
disagree over both tangible and intangible concerns (Rosenau 1971). Tangible issues might 
include control over a specific piece of land or the implementation of a certain trade policy 
among many others, while intangible issues deal with concepts like reputation, prestige, or 
ideology. Some issues can include both tangible and intangible elements. For example, the 
disposition of territory requires situating a tangible border, but it can involve intangibles such 
as national identity and self-determination. Moreover, issues vary in their saliency (Diehl 
1992). Hensel et al. find that states most readily mobilize both armies and diplomats around 
highly salient issues (2008).  
 Many scholars argue that territory is one of the most salient issues facing states, if not 
the most salient, because it includes both tangible and intangible elements (Diehl 1999; 
Newman 1999; Goertz and Diehl 1992). Territory contains natural resources deemed valuable 
by states. These include oil, mineral wealth, water, fisheries and arable land. Alternatively, 
territory can have tangible security benefits that increase its conflict proneness. Controlling 
certain sea straights shape force projection patterns. Territory also possesses intangible qualities 
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that influence its saliency to states, including national identity, group autonomy, and influence 
in domestic politics (e.g. Hensel 2000; Huth 2000; Huth 1996; Goddard 2009). Monica Duffy 
Toft writes, “No matter how barren, no territory is worthless if it is a homeland” (2003, 1). This 
may explain why apparently valueless tracts of land have been central in a series of separatist 
conflicts. It may also explain why certain interstate disputes are particularly difficult to resolve, 
such as the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. While borders have tangible 
quantities, they may also aid the formation of imagined communities (Anderson 1991). Borders 
provide a heuristic for mentally demarcating the nation that can be difficult to set aside for both 
leaders and their civilian populations. 
 However, current approaches including saliency frequently treat saliency as an inherent 
issue attribute. This view suggests that actors will always care more about certain issues, and 
will collectively spend less time on those issues mutually understood to be less important. This 
line of reasoning ignores the fact that saliency is a perception. Actors internally prioritize issues 
when determining whether a question is particularly important to them. Because leaders 
respond to divergent institutions and may have dissimilar preferences, actors can examine the 
same issue and calculate saliency very differently. For example, the Chamizal boundary dispute 
between the U.S. and Mexico inflamed nationalist passion on the Mexican side of the border, 
but went barely noticed on the U.S. side. Likewise, most Americans are unaware that United 
States maintains a long running territorial dispute with Haiti over Navassa Island. However, the 
dispute is so salient to the Haitians that they wrote their claim into their constitution. An 
investigation examining how issues, actors’ preferences, and domestic incentive structures 
interact will both move the debate on regime bellicosity forward, and advance the field’s 
understanding of the mediating effects of institutions on issue politics.  
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 Research exploring the link between regime type and territorial conflict has already 
adopted this approach implicitly; if issue saliency varies by governmental institution, then 
saliency cannot be determined without analyzing specific actors’ incentives. However, 
contemporary published scholarship focuses exclusively on democracies. James, Park and Choi 
find that when democracies disagree over territory, they are much more willing to employ force 
than democratic peace theorists suggest (2006; Mitchell and Prins 1999). Democratic 
territoriality may only occur in dyads already engrossed in long term rivalries (Lektzian et al 
2010). Scholars note that democracies are substantially less likely to have border disputes with 
their neighbors. Gibler theorizes that democracies flourish in regions with stable borders and 
suggests that resolving boundary disputes is a necessary precondition for the development of 
this form of regime (2007). Gartzke argues that most models of the democratic peace ignore the 
fact that regimes may have differential willingness to fight due to their convergence of policy 
preferences (1999; Miller and Gibler 2011). The fact that democracies have few outstanding 
territorial questions may explain why mutual democracy predicts peace.  
 While the field has begun examining the link between democracy and the relative 
saliency of territory, no current published research systematically addresses autocratic 
management of territorial disputes. Case study analysis of territorial disputes does obliquely 
suggest that regimes may vary in the treatment of boundary disputes (Fravel 2008). China, a 
single party state, appears remarkably conciliatory in its management of border disagreements. 
China has embraced negotiations and frequently accepted concessions in its talks with other 
states over land. However, current work on autocracy and territory is not broad enough to make 
generalizable claims about autocratic management of territorial disputes. In addition to 
advancing the debate on regime type and conflict propensity, and advocating for actor specific 
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interpretations of saliency, this paper fills a key gap in contemporary literature; it focuses on 
differences in autocratic sensitivity to territorial claims. 
 The previous section details the current debate on autocratic bellicosity. It suggests 
advancing this literature by adopting an issue area approach to conflict analysis and outlines the 
tenants of the issue paradigm. It also argues for increased nuance in the current issues 
approach, by evaluating how different actors’ institutions and preferences affect their 
calculations of issue saliency. The next section adopts this strategy, and examines how 
autocratic regimes manage territorial conflict.  It demonstrates that territorial conflict increases 
the domestic political control of some autocrats, while endangering the regime survival of 
others.  
Theory 
 
 Below I examine the relative incentive to militarize territorial disputes for different 
autocracies. This analysis reveals that military regimes, not personalists, manage their territorial 
disputes the most belligerently. Border fights uniquely strengthen the military as an institution. 
Moreover, sovereignty and border security fuel martial culture, and shape the identity of the 
military as a social institution. Militaries also prefer conflicts with clear cut objectives—which 
territorial warfare provides. On the other hand, while personalists may be more bellicose within 
other issue domains, these governments have motives to resist the escalation of border disputes. 
  
The Politics of Military Regimes  
 Research assessing the internal logics of authoritarian governments demonstrates that 
different autocratic structures create substantial variation in international conflict escalation. I 
argue that this regime-based variation extends even to the most violent form of conflict: the 
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territorial dispute.  First, I describe the structure of military dictatorships. I then theorize why 
military regimes fight over borders more than other regimes. 
 Most categorizations of autocracies rely upon two dimensions (Slater 2003; Weeks 2012; 
Magaloni 2006; Svolik 2009; Cheibub et al. 2010). The first dimension examines from which 
institutions within society a leader originates. Is a leader a civilian? Do they have a military or 
monarchic background? The second dimension documents the constraints a leader faces in 
exercising and maintaining their power. Military dictatorships have a group of officers decide 
who will lead the state, selecting from within their cadre (Geddes 2003).  
However, a paramount leader who holds martial rank is not sufficient to classify an 
autocracy as a military regime. Many personalist dictators have or coopt military credentials. 
For example, both Saddam Hussein and Robert Mugabe have sported uniforms, despite lacking 
a history of military service. Other personalists, including Idi Amin and Muammar Gaddafi, 
have risen to power through a military coup. The second dimension of autocratic type helps 
properly classify dictators. Examining the constraints these leaders face, and which institutions 
within society limit leaders’ decision making, can better clarify regime type.  
Military regimes face additional constraints absent in personalist dictatorships. 
Personalist regimes are characterized by a lack of institutions strong enough to challenge a 
leader’s decision making. These leaders have few, if any, veto players for whom they must 
tailor their policies. Moreover, personalists work tirelessly to maintain their unfettered control 
over the state.  Personalists prevent normalized power transitions. They regularly rewrite 
constitutions or declare martial law to avoid impending term limits. Ferdinand Marcos used 
both strategies when facing legal limits to his control over the Philippines.  
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On the other hand, while military autocracies have uniformed chiefs, they also possess 
strong militaries. In contrast to personalist regimes, the armed forces of military governments 
have enough power and independence to depose the current face of the state. Between 1967 and 
1968, Sierra Leonean army officers overthrew the head of state or ruling junta three times.  In 
some instances, juntas even institutionalize the transition of power among leading generals. 
During Argentina’s seven-year military dictatorship, the presidency shifted between six 
officers.  
Moreover, coup-plotters frequently believe that a coup will enhance the power and 
prestige of the services. Absent this belief, military regimes do not come to power. A failed 
putsch entails not only risks to the individual officers but to the whole military (Powell 2012). 
Haiti disbanded its military after a series of coup attempts. Other armed forces have undergone 
purging after an unsuccessful attempt to grab power. Syrian Ba’athists redoubled their efforts to 
expel Nasserist forces from the military after Colonel Jassem Alwan led an aborted coup. 
Additionally, coups represent a significant coordination challenge for militaries undertaking 
them (Welch 1976; Belkin and Schofer 2003). Military elites’ fear the dismemberment of the 
armed forces most of all (Geddes 1999). Inter-unit fighting destroys the corporate culture from 
which the military derives its efficacy. Coup plotters must believe that overthrowing the 
government will succeed and benefit them (Thyne 2010). Because the necessary conspirators to 
launch a successful coup frequently come from diverse backgrounds, strengthening the military 
represents the easiest method of rewarding participants. By contrast, personalist dictators 
consolidate their control over power by weakening every institution within society that might 
challenge them, often specifically targeting the military in coup-proofing attempts.  
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Territory and the Military 
Because military regimes institutionalize the transition of power between military 
insiders and have relatively politically assertive armed forces, they face unique incentives 
prompting the escalation of territorial disputes. Within military dictatorships, military elites 
constitute the primary veto players. Therefore, state policy reflects the preferences of military 
leaders. Military leaders view territory as an especially salient issue for three reasons. First, 
military culture prizes the defense of territory as the raison d’etra for the services. Second, 
territorial conflict provides a strong justification for expanding and strengthening the armed 
forces. Bureaucratic models of politics suggest that this should make military regimes 
especially territorial, since territorial conflict increases their strength relative to other 
institutions within society. Finally, terrestrial warfare tends to present more concrete military 
objectives than most other forms of conflict, and military leaders prefer it therefore. This 
section analyzes how such mechanisms result in military regimes pursuing territorial disputes at 
a higher rate of escalation, relative to other regime types.  
Military culture influences officers’ perceptions. Elizabeth Kier describes the effect of 
military training on soldiers’ worldviews: 
Few organizations devote as many resources to the assimilation of their 
members. The emphasis on ceremony and tradition, and the development of a 
common language and esprit de corps, testify to the strength of the military’s 
organization culture. The culture of an organization shapes its members 
perceptions and affects what they notice and how they interpret it: it screens out 
some parts of reality while magnifying others. (1995, 69). 
 
By providing a mental heuristic for what is important to officers, military culture defines their 
preferences. The strength of this acculturation further implies that officers will have relatively 
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predictable preferences. Military regimes will therefore behave in consistent patterns when 
addressing issues commonly emphasized within military culture. 
 Military training teaches soldiers to believe that the control and maintenance of borders 
are intensely important. Socialization of the armed forces emphasizes the military as defender 
of national sovereignty (Geddes 2003, 54). Samuel Finer describes this belief system: 
‘For the soldier…there exists neither the hamlet, nor the region, nor the 
province, nor the colony: there is for him nothing but the national territory. He 
has no family no relatives, no friends, no neighbours: only the people who live 
and work in the national territory…To it he must surrender all; safety, peace, 
family and life itself.’ Sentiments such as these would be re-echoed today in 
Cairo, Bagdad, Khartum; in Madrid or in Karachi; and wherever they are 
harboured they help lift the military to power (2009 [2002], 12).  
 
Soldiers view the world in explicitly territorial terms. They are not officers of the peace who 
use force to keep law and order. They are defenders of their particular country as defined by its 
borders. Military leaders will therefore possess relatively strong preferences about the shape of 
their country. Because territory is an especially salient issue to these elites, conflicts escalate 
more when a military regime disputes over land. 
 The territorial ideology of military leaders is a crucial source of their legitimacy. The 
military is the primary institution within society charged with securing borders. The defense of 
territory is the functional reason militaries exist; without this justification, the state has few 
reasons to bear the expense of keeping a standing army. Because of their perceived 
organizational mission, military leaders will respond to territorial conflict more decisively.  
 Although threats to a country’s territorial integrity can affect all elements of society, 
territorial disputes uniquely undermine a military regime’s identity as guardian of the state. 
When explaining his decision to invade the Falklands/Malvinas, General Leopoldo Galtieri 
said, “We have regained the southern islands that legitimately form part of our national 
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patrimony-safeguarding the national honor-without rancor, but with the firmness demanded by 
the circumstances” (quoted in New York Times 1982). Galtieri’s focus on the connection 
between territorial disputes and national honor reflects how territorial ideology influences the 
perceptions of military elites. Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military leader, also framed the 
Kashmir dispute in terms of honor: “We want to establish normal relations with India as we 
have done with all our other neighbors. But this can be done only on the basis of honor and 
equality…Let us face realities and come to an honorable settlement of the Kashmir dispute 
without which there can be no peace” (quoted in New York Times 1965).  Leaders from the 
armed forces are more likely to militarize these disputes to retain their legitimacy as defenders 
of the nation.    
 Military regimes also militarize territorial disputes more than other regimes because 
territorial conflict justifies expanding and strengthening the armed forces.  Bureaucratic 
theories of politics suggest that institutions within society vie for resources amongst each other 
(Allison 1971; Welch 1992; Hermann, et al. 2001). State budgets are finite. Resources 
expended on the military could easily benefit other institutions such as the educational system, 
the justice system, or the intelligence community. When military regimes come to power, they 
disproportionately funnel resources to the institution from which they derive their authority. 
Upon coming to power, General Sani Abacha ordered the Nigerian army to occupy Bakassi, a 
potentially oil rich region claimed by both Nigeria and Cameroon. Throughout his tenure in 
office, the Nigerian armed forces added 50 percent more personnel. Abacha also expanded 
Nigeria’s military expenditures nine-fold while managing the Bakassi dispute. Military culture 
instills within these leaders a desire for a robust security force. More importantly, since juntas 
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rely upon their fellow officers to maintain power, military regimes tend to be especially 
deferential to the armed forces.  
However, expanding the military is costly for society at large. To justify trading butter 
for guns, military regimes initiate or militarize territorial disputes. Territorial conflicts are 
especially resource intense. Only boots on the ground can expand a state’s borders or prevent 
its forceful contraction. Without sufficient numbers of well-trained soldiers, it is impossible to 
hold territory. Winning these disputes therefore requires a robust military.  
Figure 1 presents a bar graph comparing the mean size of state militaries per 100,000 
population involved in a territorial dispute with those states not party to a territorial claim. It 
demonstrates that states with territorial claims have significantly larger armed forces relative to 
the size of their populations. While military regimes might remain relatively pacific within 
other issue domains, territorial conflict provides a compelling justification for military 
expansion. 
Figure 1 
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Territorial conflict allows military regimes to channel additional resources to their 
primary constituency: their fellow soldiers. To win a territorial dispute, an army needs more 
than just personnel. Successfully militarizing a territorial claim requires a well-equipped and 
trained military force. Soldiers need to know effective combat tactics for terrestrial warfare. 
They must be sufficiently professional to allow coordination between units. Moreover, they 
must possess critical equipment for defending or annexing territory. For example, mechanized 
units are expensive, but still necessary for most terrestrial invasions. The 1965 Indo-Pakistani 
War over Kashmir saw some of the largest tank battles since World War II.  
Defenders must also spend substantial funds on fortifications (Carter 2010) and 
equipment, such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry. Figure 2 presents a bar graph 
comparing the mean military expenditures of countries involved in territorial disputes to those 
not engaged in a territorial claim. On average, states involved in a territorial dispute spend an 
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additional 2.53 billion dollars on their militaries. By militarizing an extant dispute, the leaders 
of military regimes maintain a strong justification for strengthening the armed forces as a 
bureaucratic institution. 
Figure 2 
 
 
While territorial claims fortify the corporate interests of the military and thereby reward 
military regime insiders, leading generals have additional motivations for militarizing border 
disputes. The expansion of the military inherent to a territorial dispute augments leading 
generals’ control over power. Prospective challengers to military regimes must weigh their 
ability to gain and maintain power. Expanded militaries in juntas mean that even if an 
opposition successfully ousts the regime, this opposition is unlikely to remain in office since 
the military will possess a force capable of launching another coup (Leon 2014). In fact, states 
 18 
which experience a single coup frequently experience additional attempts (Powell and Thyne 
2011). As an extreme example of this phenomenon at play, Bolivia has undergone 193 coups 
since independence in 1825. Its military has returned to power several times.  
Moreover, expanding the armed forces through militarizing a territorial claim creates a 
larger constituency reliant upon the regime. By encouraging the spread of military culture 
through wider portions of a state’s population, military regimes insulate their control over 
power. In addition to cultivating a stronger base of natural regime allies, spreading their 
ideology diffuses military elites’ preferences through society. Other scholars have noted that 
military regimes frequently plan short stints in office, but use their time at the top to align other 
political actors’ preferences with their own (Cook 2007). These leaders strategically entrench 
their preferences in institutions throughout a society if they believe they cannot hold on to 
power (Boylan 2001). Such tactics force successors to continue the previous government’s 
preferred policies. Escalating territorial conflict provides an additional method military regimes 
use to emboss the armed forces’ worldview upon a state’s future political process. 
Finally, military leaders prefer to fight conflicts with clear and measurable objectives. 
Furthermore, they prefer to use force when force is an appropriate tool to achieve a mission 
goal. Colin Powell outlines this world view common to generals:  
When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when 
the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined 
with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives 
must be given to the armed forces. We must not, for example send military 
forces into a crisis with an unclear mission they cannot accomplish… (1992) 
 
Generals frequently wish to avoid conflicts with moving mission goals, and conflicts unlikely 
to be solved by sending more soldiers. With its clear goals and soldier-based strength, 
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terrestrial warfare presents the preferred form of conflict for most military elites. Land is 
delimited, and therefore these missions experience fewer changing objectives.  
 Other forms of conflict do not instigate well-defined goals. For example, economic 
disagreements may not require the military to act at all, and using force may even prove 
counterproductive. Intervention with the intent to change another state’s regime frequently 
produces prolonged conflicts with no easy exit strategies. Although toppling another state’s 
government can be achieved militarily, establishing a new government often proves difficult 
for generals. Together, the relative simplicity of territorial conflict and the institutional 
incentives inherent in military regimes explain leaders’ behavior. Juntas do not simply 
militarize all disputes, but rather focus on the fights they believe they have the tools and 
strategy to win. Leading generals therefore militarize those conflicts which justify expanding 
the armed forces, but they avoid squandering military assets and personnel. 
 One potential challenge to this theory is that military service engenders caution and an 
unwillingness to escalate a dispute if it can be avoided. Theorists of military conservativism 
argue that military training and battlefield experiences prompt officers to develop a risk-averse 
outlook towards the use of force (Huntington 1957). Military officers may also be more 
realistic about what force can and cannot achieve, and thus avoid fights that an unexperienced 
civilian might pursue (Janowitz 1960). However, experimental psychological research suggests 
that actual exposure to battle is an important mediator in whether military elites adopt a risk 
acceptant or risk averse attitude (Voors et al 2010, Brunk, Secrest and Tamashiro 1990, 
Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik 2015, Wallace 2014). This strand of research deeply 
questions the notion that all military service produces a conservative attitude towards the use of 
force. Horowitz and Stam find that leaders with a military background and no combat 
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experience as well as military leaders with a rebel combat background are especially likely to 
escalate disputes (2014). Because most juntas rise to power through some form of coup or 
rebellion, these military leaders are likely to be more militarily activist than the average officer 
(Weeks 2012). It follows that juntas will evince higher degrees of military activism towards 
territorial disputes.   
This section has outlined three mechanisms explaining why military regimes are 
especially bellicose when involved in a territorial claim: military culture, bureaucratic 
incentives, and a martial preference for clear battlefield objectives. It argues that military 
culture is suffused with a territorial ideology that influences the preferences of military officers. 
When these officers come to power, they will thus view border disputes as particularly salient 
issues. Moreover, this territorial ideology underpins the armed forces as a legitimate institution 
within society. Challenges to a state’s borders not only imperil the country, they test the very 
legitimacy of the military. Junta leaders will therefore disproportionately militarize territorial 
disputes to maintain their identity as defenders of the national honor. These conflicts also have 
clear military objectives which generals are trained to deliver. Non-territorial warfare by 
contrast frequently involves missions ill-suited to the use of armies, navies, and air forces. 
Finally, territorial disputes are resource intense conflicts. By militarizing a territorial claim, 
presiding generals have a compelling justification for expanding and strengthening their forces. 
Since soldiers are the primary constituency affecting the leaders of juntas, generals have a 
strong motive for increasing the armed forces. Providing additional resources to the military not 
only allow military regime leaders to transfer rents to their key supporters. Expanding the 
military deters potential opposition from challenging the regime.   
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Personalist Dictatorships and Territory 
 
 While personalists are one of the most belligerent forms of autocratic governance across 
a diverse set of issue areas, these regimes have compelling reasons not to escalate territorial 
conflicts. This section introduces the politics of personalist dictatorships. Territorial conflict 
undermines common strategies personalists employ to maintain their hold over society. I 
therefore argue that personalists will be less bellicose than commonly expected when faced 
with a border dispute.    
 Military regimes answer the questions of who leads and who constrains leaders by 
elevating military elites to paramount positions, but still necessitating reliance upon a number 
of officers to maintain power. Unlike military regimes, personalists lack any strong 
institutional-based constraint to their rule. This form of autocrat enjoys unparalleled and 
unfettered discretion over state policy. Other regimes contain independent and strong 
institutions such as courts, a democratic public, or organized and influential parties. These veto 
players can impact or change state policy. Personalist regimes do not possess veto players who 
challenge their decisions or place in office.  
 Because of this lack of institutionally induced constraints, the literature expects 
personalist regimes to be especially aggressive. War is commonly believed to benefit only 
narrow segments of a state’s population. Therefore, societies with wider audiences are expected 
to be more pacific (Fearon 1994, Snyder 1993, Prins 2003, Lipson 2003, Ireland and Gartner 
2001, Koch and Gartner 2005, Koch 2009). Since personalists lack powerful groups within 
society to whom they must accommodate their policies, these leaders are more able to take the 
war path. Moreover, the literature suggests personalists must engage in especially violent and 
risk acceptant behavior to come to power (Horowitz, McDermott and Stam 2005). Not only 
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must they topple the current power structure of their state when they take office, they must also 
prevent challenges to their rule by employing various forms of repression. Because personalist 
leaders use violence domestically to achieve their aims, the field expects they will 
internationalize this behavior.  
 However, the field’s portrait of personalist dictators as universally militarily assertive 
rulers ignores the nuances of how these leaders maintain their power. While personalist heads 
of state face few institutional constraints to their decision making, these dictators adopt 
strategies to ensure their regime’s survival. A personalist must therefore forestall the ways in 
which leaders of their ilk generally lose office. Svolik finds that dictators lose power most 
commonly through coups (2009). It follows that these autocrats devote substantial resources to 
preventing regime insiders or the military from replacing them. 
 Because coups require military support, dictators strategically undermine the military. 
Personalists systematically undercut the military by engaging in coup-proofing tactics 
(Quinlivan 1999). Such tactics include replacing merit-based promotion with political or co-
ethnics-based promotions, supporting the overspecialization of military forces, and 
undermining the military’s fighting efficacy (Pilster and Bohmelt 2011). Because of the ever-
looming specter of a coup, personalist dictators strategically evade conflicts which might 
strengthen the armed forces (Leon 2014). These leaders therefore have strong regime survival 
motivations to avoid escalating territorial disputes.  
 Winning a territorial dispute requires an effective fighting force. Moreover, these 
conflicts are resource intense. Holding territory demands large infantries. It requires 
coordination to prevent flanking at newly established borders. However, a large professional 
military can topple a regime (Feaver 1999). Personalists will systematically avoid escalating 
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territorial disputes to avoid strengthening the military and the hands of would-be coup plotters.  
For example, territorial neutral zones and no-man’s lands—bordering areas in which two 
countries mutually avoid delineating a border—are very rare. Only 8 such areas have existed 
since 1900, including Antarctica. Personalist dictators were party to 5 of these disputes. Despite 
decades of tense relations and an international reputation for extreme bellicosity, Saddam 
Hussein tolerated the existence of a neutral zone with Saudi Arabia and peacefully negotiated 
over its management. Similarly, Francisco Franco avoided militarizing Spain’s dispute with the 
United Kingdom over Gibraltar even when Hitler offered his government military aid to take 
the peninsula. Instead, the Franco regime eventually established a neutral area between the two 
territories. Avoiding or peacefully negotiating territorial conflict is consistent with these 
regimes’ established pattern of enfeebling the armed forces through coup-proofing. 
 As rational international leaders, personalists are concerned with more than simply 
maintaining their power. They also wish to maximize battlefield successes. The observed 
regularity that personalists are especially belligerent exists because in other issue domains these 
dictators do not face as acute a tradeoff between maintaining regime survival and ensuring 
military victory. For example, developing a nuclear arsenal allows personalists to strengthen 
their state vis-à-vis others, but doesn’t provide personnel or training capable of emboldening 
military challengers to the regime. Unique among weapons, nuclear arsenals frequently feature 
civilian rather than purely military control. Personalists can engage in revolutionary conflict 
without threatening their tenure in office because these more populist conflicts do not tend to 
rely upon a professional fighting force. Likewise, economic and regime-based grievances can 
be successfully fought with fewer boots on the ground. Since dictators do not face the dilemma 
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between winning on the battlefield and maintaining power within other issue areas, territory is 
probably one of the few issues areas where personalists are less belligerent.  
Research Methods and Findings 
Returning to the question, “who makes bad neighbors?” I examine dispute observations 
between 1945 and 2007. I draw observations from the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Dispute 
dataset (DYADMID). As I am interested in conflict onset, I employ a directed-dyad year unit 
of analysis. Directed-dyads are appropriate for testing theories about the identity of the conflict 
initiating state (Bennett and Stam, 2000).  To test my hypothesis that military regimes are more 
territorial and thus more conflict prone than other types of regimes, I estimate a series of 
statistical models.  
Dependent Variable: Initiation of a Militarized Dispute 
My outcome of interest is a state’s conflict proneness. I employ measures of dispute 
initiation drawn from DYADMID. MID initiation is coded when a state uses or explicitly 
threatens force against a target country. Theories of territorial preferences suggest that states 
are likely to disagree over the distribution of land because of territory’s high salience. Not only 
is territory important to states: territory can also influence elites’ willingness to consider force. 
Dispute initiation captures a state’s choice to militarize a disagreement it has with another 
country. Moreover, conflict onset is interesting in and of itself to scholars of International 
Relations. Our models attempt to explain and perhaps even predict why conflict emerges.   
Measuring Regime Sensitivity to Territorial Issues 
For my analysis of comparative authoritarian form, I rely on Geddes’s coding of regime 
type (2003, Geddes et al. 2014). Scholarship on comparative authoritarianism frequently uses 
Geddes’s data (Peceny et al. 2002; Peceny and Beer 2003; Reiter and Stam 2003; Weeks 2008; 
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Weeks 2012; Way and Weeks 2014). Using her coding will therefore make my results more 
comparable with the majority of literature on authoritarian international relations. Geddes codes 
regimes as personalist, military, single party, or a hybrid, starting from the year 1945. Dummy 
variables indicate whether the regime was entirely personalist, single-party, or military, or 
possessed personalist, single-party, or military features. Other regime types are treated as the 
residual category.  
Territorial claims proxy an international actor’s sensitivity to territory (Senese and 
Vasquez 2003; Senese 2005; Rasler and Thompson 2006; Lee and Mitchell 2012). To capture 
the fact that territorial issues and not just shared borders shape conflict outcomes, I employ a 
measurement of territorial claims derived from Huth and Allee (2002). They code all territorial 
disputes (not to be confused with militarized disputes since these are a collection of state claims 
against the territory of another state) from 1919 to 1995. I updated the data on the presence of 
territorial disputes within a dyad between 1996 and 2007. I derived this extended universe of 
territorial claims from thousands of articles available through Lexis-Nexis, the International 
Boundary Research Unit’s aggregation of news on territorial disputes, and Wiegand (2011). 
I theorize that a state’s regime type affects its sensitivity to territorial claims and by 
extension its conflict-proneness. A regime’s domestic institutions mediate the effects of a 
territorial threat, and shape their acquisitiveness for land. I argue that military regimes have an 
incentive structure which encourages them to militarize territorial demands while personalists 
have fewer reasons to employ force. Therefore, I developed a series of measures to account for 
the differing saliency of territory to different regimes. I interacted Geddes typological dummies 
with the presence of a territorial dispute. This created a set of two specific territorial dispute 
moderator variables which I employ as my key independent variables. 
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Results 
My results present strong evidence that military regimes are more likely than other 
governments to militarize disputes involving a territorial claim. To contextualize my findings 
on conflict propensity, I first analyze the relative rates of territorial disputes and autocratic 
regime types. My unit of analysis is the directed dyad-year. Territorial disputes are very rare. 
They occur in less than 1% of directed-dyad years (0.5%). However, territorial disputes 
frequently arise concurrently with militarization. In 32.3% of militarized disputes, the dyad has 
an ongoing boundary disagreement. 
Likewise, military regimes are an uncommon form of governance. Only 6% of all 
directed-dyad years between 1945 and 2007 feature states ruled by officers of the armed forces. 
By comparison, single party regimes oversee 23% of directed dyad-years, and personalists 
account for 12% of the data. This reflects the fact that military regimes generally maintain 
power for shorter durations than other regimes, while institutionalizing their preferences within 
society for after they transition out of power (Cook 2007). Juntas may only occasionally come 
to power, but they disproportionately fight over borders. Figure 3 highlights the mean 
militarization level of dyads involved in a territorial dispute, comparing the rate of 
militarization achieved by military regimes to non-military, non-personalist states. While 
conflict is a relatively rare event, the figure highlights the stark differences between military 
and non-military regimes. Military regimes engage in aggressive behavior in territorial disputes 
136% more readily than other types of states.  
 
 
 
 27 
Figure 3 
 
 Although personalists make up more of the data, they do not account for significantly 
more militarized territorial disputes. Figure 3 also plots the mean militarization level of dyads 
with an ongoing territorial disagreement and contrasts personalists’ level of militarization to 
that of other non-military and single party regime types. The bar chart demonstrates that 
personalists do not fight over territory more readily than other regimes. Moreover, personalists 
account for less militarization than their military counterparts.  
 However, confounders may complicate these relationships. Since regime type is 
unlikely to be randomly distributed, naïve comparisons of means are insufficient to analyze the 
causal relationship in question. Military regimes may form in countries with higher military 
capabilities, which may also be associated with a greater propensity to militarize 
disagreements. Military governance might also co-vary geographically. Geographic factors are 
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widely acknowledged to affect conflict initiation. Since these and other confounding variables 
could obscure the relationship between different regimes’ territorial sensitivity and conflict 
proneness, I estimate logistic regression models with theoretically relevant control variables. 
 Though Political Science as a discipline has long acknowledged the importance of 
controlling for omitted variables, appropriate controls remain contested. One approach to 
quantitative research builds models with a wide range of variables which are then compared as 
correlates rather than as individual causes of a dependent variable of interest. The downside to 
a “causes of effects” approach, however, is that models using this approach can include 
theoretically unmotivated variables, or worse—theoretically illegitimate variables—biasing 
results and clouding interpretation of the data (Ray 2003; Achen 2005; Clarke 2009). 
Alternatively, scholars adopting an “effects of causes” approach must focus exclusively 
on conditioning variables which will result in valid inferences (Morgan and Winship 2007). 
Appropriate controls are variables which affect both key independents and dependent variables. 
However, variables which are a consequence of key independent variables are inappropriate 
controls due to their ability to induce post-treatment bias (Gelman and Hill 2006; Angrist and 
Pischke 2008). For my purposes, legitimate control variables cause military or personalist 
regimes to form, encourage these governments to behave territorially, and promote the 
militarization of a dispute. Variables which are a consequence of regime type or regime 
sensitivity to territorial disputes should not be included within regressions because they can 
mask or distort the causal effect of interest. Moreover, the magnitude and direction of this type 
of bias is not a priori knowable. Unfortunately, many of the variables commonly employed 
within analyses of territorial and militarized disputes are impacted by regime type. Examples of 
“post-treatment” variables found within the territory and conflict literatures include economic 
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openness (Lee and Mitchell 2012; Meseguer and Escriba-Folch 2011; Hankla and Kuthy 2013; 
Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000) and prior conflict history. My models therefore only 
control for variables which are not caused by regime type. 
Since MID data are a pooled cross-section, they violate the temporal independence 
assumption of logit analysis (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). To address this, I use time-based 
indicators. First, I include a count of peace years. Peace years tally the time period in which a 
dyad goes without a MID. If a MID occurs, the counter is reset to 0 and continues counting up 
until another MID occurs. Following Carter and Signorino’s advice, I also model higher orders 
of time by including the square and cube of peace years (2010). 
 I begin my analysis with a basic model that includes a set of regime-territorial dispute 
interaction terms, their constituent regime type and territorial dispute dummies, a control for 
contiguity, a control for time between claims, and the cubic polynomial variables addressing 
temporal dependence issues. The contiguity control, drawn from COW data, captures the 
opportunity to fight. Opportunity to fight could be an alternative pathway to territorial saliency 
through which conflict over land emerges (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). Since states are highly 
conscribed in their ability to dictate the identity of their neighbors, contiguity is handled as a 
pre-treatment confounder. This variable accounts for both land and maritime proximity, and 
ranges from 1 to 6 with lower numbers indicating greater contiguity. The claims year control 
accounts for the fact that border insecurity can shape a society’s domestic political structure 
(Gibler 2007) and a state’s conflict proneness. I developed a count of years in which a dyad 
goes without a territorial claim. If a border dispute occurs, my counter resets to 0. 
 Table 1 reports the results from this model. It demonstrates that military regimes 
engaged in a territorial dispute are significantly more conflict prone than democracies and non-
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military/non-personalist autocracies. As expected, contiguity is significantly related to the 
militarization of a dispute. Since lower values of this variable account for more contiguousness, 
the direction of this relationship is as expected. The claims year count variable is also highly 
significant. Interestingly, the direction of the effect suggests that border stability tends to decay 
over time. However, the magnitude of this border decay is muted. This contrasts with peace 
year counts which generally observe that peace crystallizes the longer it endures. My time 
polynomials are highly significant and perform consistently with previous work.  
Table 1: Autocratic Territoriality and the Initiation of a Militarized Dispute 
Predictor Basic Model Plus Power 
Status 
Plus 
Capabilities 
Plus Foreign Policy 
Similarity 
Military Regime 
Territoriality  
.606.001 .561.002 .637.001 .675<.001 
 (.184) (.183) (.183) (.185) 
Personalist Regime 
Territoriality  
-.129.434 .000.999 .047.778 .029.864 
 (.165) (.165) (.166) (.167) 
Single Party Territoriality 
 
Military Regime 
-.261.452 
(.127) 
.307.040 
-.415.001 
(.128) 
.503<.001 
-.409.002 
(.129) 
.485<.001 
-.407.002 
(.130) 
.488<.001 
 (.114) (.114) (.113) (.114) 
Personalist Regime .725.007 .729<.001 .663<.001 .657<.001 
 
Single Party Regime 
(.084) 
.679<.001 
(.067) 
(.085) 
.576<.001 
(.068) 
(.085) 
.534<.001 
(.068) 
(.088) 
.502<.001 
(.073) 
Territorial Dispute 2.28<.001 2.09<.001 1.96<.001 1.99<.001 
 (.102) (.101) (.102) (.103) 
Contiguity -.64<.001 -.654<.001 -.634<.001 -.627<.001 
 
Claims Year 
(.013) 
.021<.001 
(.001) 
(.012) 
.017<.001 
(.001) 
(.012) 
.015<.001 
(.001) 
(.013) 
.016<.001 
(.000) 
Minor x Minor Power 
Dyad 
 -1.11<.001 -1.35<.001 -1.33<.001 
  (.059) (.066) (.067) 
Ln(High/Low Capabilities 
Ratio) 
  -.155<.001 -.147<.001 
   (.017) (.018) 
A’s Similarity to System 
Leader 
   -.161..238 
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    (.137) 
B’s Similarity to System 
Leader 
   -.327.012 
    (.13) 
Years without a MID (t) -.153<.001 -.153<.001 -.153<.001 -.151<.001 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
t2 .002<.001 .002<.001 .002<.001 .002<.001 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
t3 -.000<.001 -.000<.001 -.000<.001 -.000<.001 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Constant -2.91<.001 -1.80<.001 -1.26.<.001 -1.16<.001 
 (.084) (.1) (.115) (.124) 
Pseudo R2 .3458 0.3569 .3599 .3593 
Log likelihood -9190.66 -9034.37 -8989.45 -8820.20 
N 1118314 1118314 1116420 1080610 
Notes: Two-tailed p-values in italicized super-scripts, standard errors in parentheses.  
 
In the next columns, I report three modifications to this basic model. First, I include a 
dyadic measure of power status as a non-post-treatment measure of power projection abilities. 
This variable highlights dyads containing only minor powers since these dyads should have 
substantially less ability to launch military force.  Second, I account for relative national 
capabilities within the dyad. To do so I use a higher/lower ratio of each countries composite 
index of national capabilities. I employ the natural log of this variable. Both controls are drawn 
from the COW capabilities dataset 
Finally, I include measures of each country’s foreign policy and alliance similarity to 
the leading state within a system (s_ld_1 and s_ld_2). States with greater ties to the system 
leader tend to be less revisionist and therefore should initiate fewer conflicts (Schultz 2001). I 
include a dyadic measure of this concept because strong ties with a superpower could deter 
other states from initiating a MID. Some scholars argue that regime type impacts alliance 
patterns, with democratic allied dyads being more likely in any given year (Kimball 2010; 
Siverson and Emmons 1991). If they are correct, S, which includes alliances within its measure 
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of foreign policy similarity, might be a post-treatment variable (Way and Weeks 2014). 
However, other scholars have found very little evidence connecting regime type and alliance 
formation (Lai and Ritter 2000; Simon and Gartzke 1996).  How can shared regime type impact 
the odds of being in an alliance in a given year and yet not have a positive association with the 
formation of alliances? Gibler and Wolford’s findings that states democratize during an alliance 
may help explain this pattern (2006). They write: 
Instead of regime type determining the choice of allies, we argue that certain 
types of alliances preserve peace by reducing the territorial threat to member 
states, and as the presence of territorial threat can hamper transitions to 
democracy, these alliances may contribute to the democratization of their member 
states (130).  
 
Their analysis suggests that alliance patterns affect both conflict onset and regime type. As 
such, it is a crucial pre-treatment conditioning variable within an “effects of causes” analysis of 
autocratic conflict emergence.  
These additional control variables behave in line with previous studies and are usually 
highly significant. If a dyad consists of only minor powers, my results imply that the country 
pair has a diminished likelihood of engaging in a militarized dispute. Increased power disparity 
likewise suppresses the chances of a MID onset. While not significant, when a possible initiator 
has closer ties with the system leader, it is less likely to initiate a dispute. This accords with 
previous findings demonstrating that countries closely aligned with a superpower are less 
revisionist. The negative coefficient on targets’ ties with the system leader is also consistent 
with the previously observed deterrent effect.  
 Regardless of specification, military regimes’ heightened sensitivity to territorial 
conflicts increases the probability of a dispute onset. The effects of a military regime with an 
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existing territorial dispute are moreover statistically significant according to two-tailed tests 
across my various models.  
 Interpreting interaction within logistic regressions is not intuitive due to the inherent 
nonlinearity of these models. Compression naturally induces interaction between all variables 
in binary response models (Nagler 1991; Berry and Berry 1991). Therefore, researchers must 
have a sound theoretical argument for including explicit interaction terms above and beyond 
the effects of compression within a logistic model (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005; Berry, 
DeMerrit and Esarey 2010). I hypothesize that military regimes find territorial conflict 
especially attractive due to the institutional incentives and cultures of these governments. 
Moreover, I argue that personalist regimes should be less likely to court militarized conflict 
over a territorial dispute because these conflicts empower possible coup plotters. My theory of 
how domestic institutions mediate the perceptions of territorial threat and value of territorial 
conflict therefore provides a strong basis for the inclusion of an explicit interaction. However, 
compression also complicates substantive explanations of interaction terms. Jaccard advocates 
for employing odds ratios to simplify analysis of substantive effects (2001). Within my full 
model, military regimes are nearly twice as likely to initiate a conflict over a territorial question 
compared to other types of governments. By contrast, personalist dictators facing a territorial 
dispute are not statistically more likely than other regimes to threaten or use force. These 
results are robust to adding a variety of other variables, employing a rare events data correction, 
and altering the base regime category. I report these additional robustness checks in an 
appendix.  
 My theory predicts that military regimes facing a territorial dispute have a statistically 
positive relationship with conflict onset, but that personalist dictators will not demonstrate such 
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a relationship. However, I also argue that important differences between these regime types 
which produce this divergent behavior. To ascertain whether this is true, it is insufficient to 
merely demonstrate that the coefficient on the military regime-territorial dispute interaction 
term is significant while the personalism-territorial claim coefficient is insignificant. I therefore 
conduct a test of equality between coefficients. I find that military regime interaction is 
statistically distinct from personalist interaction at the .05 level (using a two-tailed test).  This 
provides strong evidence that personalist are less territorial their junta counterparts.  
Conclusion 
 This article argues that debates about which regimes are the most belligerent or peaceful 
are pointless without considering how issue area interacts with a regime’s domestic institutions. 
 One type of regime may find territory especially salient and therefore conflict inducing. 
Another government with different internal structures may manage these disputes more 
peacefully. However, their conflict-proneness may switch when the same governments face 
foreign policy questions in different issue areas. My findings suggest that such a pattern exists 
within the domain of territorial dispute management. Military regimes have both institutional 
and cultural reasons for militarizing border conflicts. By contrast, personalists are less likely to 
initiate a conflict over a territorial dispute because they fear empowering military elites who 
may wish to remove them from office via a coup d’état. 
This finding has two related theoretical implications. First, adopting a research agenda 
which examines the interaction between regime type and issue area may help resolve long 
standing puzzles in the comparative regimes conflict literature. A variety of studies find that 
personalists are especially violent international actors. However, other research instead 
observes that military regimes account for most disputes. Because both schools aggregate issue 
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area, these studies obscure the relationship between internal regime structures and leaders’ 
calculations of salience. Rather than asking which regime is the most violent or peaceful, the 
field should attempt to answer the following question: which issue areas are particularly 
triggering to which regimes? 
 This study also has lessons for issue area scholars. In the past, researchers have 
attempted to categorize and rank issues by their degree of saliency. While regime scholars’ 
debate over which government structures produce the most conflict, issue area researchers ask 
which issues are most volatile. Such an approach assumes that saliency does not vary across 
actors. It implies that states are territorial because land is always extremely important to 
everyone.  However, my findings demonstrate that calculations of saliency are contingent upon 
institutions. By focusing on territorial dispute management, my results show that regimes can 
respond heterogeneously within the same issue domain. Rather than assuming that all 
international actors rank issue saliency in the same way, scholars should treat this as an 
empirical question.  
 To further both agendas, future research should examine how regime type interacts with 
additional issues. This paper has demonstrated that military regimes handle territorial conflict 
more violently than personalist regimes. But how will these regimes manage economic 
disputes, or international conflicts over their very regime structure? Could regime interact with 
other policy areas? Answering these questions will enrich our understanding of the ways in 
which domestic political institutions shape interstate outcomes, and grant International 
Relations a clearer picture of “second-image” politics. Moreover, further investigation will 
provide the field with a better understanding of who fights, when and why.  
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 Substantively, this research raises interesting questions about the saliency of territory 
and conflict proneness of other types of authoritarians. As a robustness check, I examined a 
model treating democracies as the base category, rather than all non-personalist or non-junta 
regimes. The results demonstrate that single party regimes may find territory less salient than 
democracies. This conflicts with the field’s belief that democracies are the most relatively 
pacific type of government. Future research should explore which issues are relatively 
triggering to democracies. However, the single party finding requires more research given 
China’s dominant presence within the territory issue domain. It does raise interesting questions 
about the rise of China. If single-party regimes do not find territory to be an especially salient 
issue area, China’s rise may be more peaceful than previous great power transitions.   
 In addition to its theoretical implications, the findings contain policy lessons. Previous 
scholarship has argued that diplomacy with military elites frequently breaks down because 
eaders are trained to see a world of threat. This world view exacerbates the security dilemma 
and produces devastating conflict spirals. My analysis suggests that juntas may find some types 
of disputes more threatening than others. Specifically, other states will find it especially 
difficult to negotiate border agreements with governing generals. Diplomats should expend 
extra effort assuaging the fears of military dictators when involved in a territorial dispute.  
Moreover, juntas face fewer costs when engaging in territorial warfare because this 
form of conflict strengthens their core supporters. States with an active territorial claim against 
a military autocracy should invest in extra deterrent capacity in order to dissuade these leaders 
from escalating. By raising the costs of territorial warfare, targeted states may persuade juntas 
that attacking is not worth the effort. States targeted by military regimes with a territorial claim 
must also send unambiguous signals of resolve to prevent conflict from breaking out. Strategic 
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ambiguity courts miscalculation by governing generals already inclined to use force in 
managing border disagreements. For example, if the United Kingdom had sent unequivocal 
signals of their intent to keep the Falkland Islands, including fortifying them, this may have 
persuaded the Argentinian junta not to attack.  
 There are also lessons for managing disputes with personalists. Contrary to views that 
all states care deeply about territory, personalists have extra incentives to avoid fighting over 
land. This opens additional bargaining range that diplomats should employ to reduce border 
insecurity. Furthermore, scholarship suggests that resolving territorial disputes is frequently a 
first step towards democratization. Countries interested in spreading democracy should 
therefore emphasize negotiated border settlements with personalists, since they will be more 
willing to bargain than other forms of autocrats. This method of encouraging regime change 
relies upon slow, structural changes and should be less threatening to targeted governments 
than more overt or forceful techniques.  
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PAPER 2 
 
UNSTABLE GROUND: 
WHY DO STATES CLOSE BORDERS 
Introduction: 
 
     The civil war in Syria has produced the largest refugee crisis to date. Between 2011 and 
2016, 4.8 million people have attempted to flee the violence within Syria by seeking asylum or 
refugee status outside of the country. Syrians have hiked hundreds of miles, rafted in dangerous 
overflowing dinghies, navigated bureaucratic hurdles, and sought the aid of smugglers to escape 
Assad’s unrelenting bombing campaigns, mass human rights violations, and sporadic use of 
illegal chemical weapons. The magnitude of the crisis has strained the international community’s 
compassion. Many states along refugee corridors have argued that the mass influx of war-
ravaged survivors stresses their resources and political stability. To stem the tide, some states 
have taken to shutting their doors on refugees. In a concerted effort to close off Europe to fleeing 
Syrians, the EU and several countries coordinated efforts to close what had become known as the 
Balkan route to the few countries within Europe offering safe haven en mass in 2016-namely 
Germany and Sweden. In January 2016, Austria took the dramatic step of suspending the 
Schengen agreement to increase border controls. In February, it introduced 12 new border 
checkpoints and substantially limited the number of asylum seekers it allowed to pass through 
them. Finally, at the end of March, it began rejecting almost all asylum seekers hoping to enter 
the country. States located between Austria and Greece along the Balkan route, fearing that they 
would be stuck with fleeing migrants due to this closure, followed suit and diplomatically sealed 
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their borders to refugees. This represents the first large scale international effort to use border 
management to mitigate the effects of a crisis.  
     Though the current Syrian refugee crisis is unparalleled in its magnitude and impact, 
states have used border controls to manage many smaller and less transnational crises. However, 
International Relations has paid little attention to how and why states employ border 
management techniques to achieve political goals. The paucity of research into this question is 
particularly surprising considering the emphasis states place on the good regulation of their 
borders. Historically, border controls allowed states to deter invasion, protect local industries 
through tariffs and import restrictions, and tax trade. Regardless of the claims that globalization 
has rendered borders irrelevant, states continue to expend significant effort attempting to control 
cross border flows. Rather than diminishing in importance, border control techniques continue to 
evolve to address new economic and security concerns.  Borders are a principal tool states use to 
limit unwanted immigration, domestic political meddling by foreign actors, drug trafficking and 
other smuggling, refugee flows, and terrorist infiltration (Andreas 2003; Krasner 1999). Well-
functioning border management thus has important implications for state security, wealth, and 
domestic stability. It is therefore imperative that the field ask the following questions: Why and 
when do states close their borders? Why do states chose border closures over other available 
management techniques? And how do states manage their borders during both long-term and 
short-term crises?  
     States have several potential strategies when dealing with a border crisis. They can 
maintain the status quo and ignore the crisis. They can militarize their border by adding more 
guards; Iran did this in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions by the United States. 
(Gavrilis 2008; Andreas 2003, 2000). They can build fences to focus flows towards official 
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crossings (Carter and Poast 2017; Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). For example, Israel has several 
border fences that aim to steer traffic towards approved and controlled crossings. Or they can 
shut the border down. The Trump administration made closing the U.S. border to refugees of 
several countries a first week regime priority.  Between 1980 and 2011, states closed their 
borders 546 times. Approximately half of these closures occurred between 2001 and 2011. 
Figure 1 highlights the over-time trends in number of border closures and demonstrates that 
border closures are gaining in popularity among states, rather than declining.  
 
An emerging literature on border management techniques has begun to tackle questions 
of how states control flows across their frontiers. Early studies have produced promising 
explanations for the militarization of borders and the erection of border fences. However, border 
management scholars have yet to tackle the correlates of border closures, despite the rising 
popularity of this technique among states. I extend the border management research agenda by 
conducting the first study of border closure practices. I hypothesize that civil wars in bordering 
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countries encourage states to close their borders. This contradicts past research that has argued 
civil wars do not prompt states to change their border management practices (Poast and Carter 
2017). I develop a theoretical framework which explains why states close borders during refugee 
crises but do not build fences. This framework further explains why states build fences but do 
not close borders during economic crises. I argue that states engage in a cost-benefit analysis 
when managing their borders which forces them to balance the duration and intensity of the 
crisis against the cost and inflexibility of a proposed management technique. This paper provides 
the first cross-national investigation into the causes of border closures. Moreover, while scholars 
have examined some border control strategies in isolation, this paper provides the first cross-
national comparison of when states might employ different management practices.  It further 
develops an integrated theory explaining how states select among the portfolio of their border 
management tactics that accounts for past findings within this research program, namely that 
economic disparity encourages states to build fences, as well as my new finding that they do not 
close borders due to economic inequality. 
     While my theoretical contribution expands the border control literature, my newly 
introduced data has additional applications outside of this research agenda. Border closures have 
been an important hallmark of several political rivalries. North Korea has kept its border closed 
with South Korea during most of the last six decades. North Korea maintained the closure even 
though it kept them internationally isolated, and that it prevented them from benefitting from 
East Asia’s development miracle. Similarly, Turkey has sealed its border with Armenia since 
1993, when Armenia invaded Azerbaijan. It has also been used intermittently in shorter term 
rivalries such as between Thailand and Cambodia, or between Kenya and Somalia during 
particularly chaotic periods in Somali politics. Therefore, data on border closures could provide 
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early warning data for the emergence of state conflict and rivalry. Moreover, while significant 
research underlines how territorial disputes can escalate into violence, very little work provides a 
foundation for how states select into these disputes (a notable exception is Huth 1996). Yet, 
states often close their borders during the lead up to a territorial dispute: as seen prior to the 
Kahemba dispute between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, the Doi Lang dispute 
between Thailand and Myanmar, and Lebanon throwing its hat into the Shebaa Farm dispute 
between Israel and Syria.  Border closure data may productively enrich models of territorial 
dispute escalation and management by helping correct for selection effects. Finally, studies of 
cross-border flows such as international trade, foreign investment, and migration research have 
yet to consider state's ability to close borders. This is a notable oversight that could produce 
substantially biased estimates. These data should help scholars correct for the effects of closed 
borders in future research into the international movement of goods, money, and people.    
     I develop my argument as follows. First, I briefly review the scholarship on border crises 
and management. Next, I provide a theoretical explanation for why civil wars should not be 
discounted as a source of border crises in the face of previous findings. This section also 
develops a theoretical explanation for why states choose different strategies when immersed in 
different types of crises. Third, I outline my method and research design for evaluating my 
hypotheses. In the fourth section, I test my hypotheses using a new dataset of state border 
closures between 1980 and 2011 and describe my empirical findings. I conclude by suggesting 
further directions the border management research agenda should take.  
Literature Review 
International Relations scholars have long argued that states are especially prone to fight 
over territory, and that disputes over the location of borders are uniquely violent (Vasquez 1993; 
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Kocs 1995; Diehl 1999; Hensel 2000; Senese 2005; Huth and Allee 2002; James, Park and Choi 
2006; Mitchell and Hensel 2007; Tir and Diehl 2002; Rasler and Thompson 2006; Simmons 
2005). However, an effective border is more than an undisputed and fully demarcated line. 
Borders control the flows of people and goods between states. They are also loci of diplomatic 
contact between state representatives. Whole bureaucratic institutions spring up to manage 
customs outposts and guard crossings. An emerging literature analyzes how borders can become 
sites of contestation between states even when their governments fully agree on the status quo 
division of territory. This promising research agenda analyzes states’ attempts to stabilize their 
borders in the face of challenge.  
Research into the institutional failure of, and challenges to, borders has followed one of 
two paths: in depth case studies of border management and mismanagement, or large-N studies 
of a single border management strategy. States can employ multiple strategies to manage their 
borders, some of which are relatively effective, and other which are relatively counterproductive 
(Gavrilis 2008). Gavrilis analyzes cases where states have delegated significant decisions to their 
border agents and empowered them to work across the border with their peers, cases where states 
have centralized and disempowered their border stewards, and cases where states have 
militarized their borders. Gavrilis posits that borders become unstable when states overly 
centralize their management of customs agents and border guards. He theorizes that stable 
borders emerge when local officials on both sides of a border have enough autonomy to 
coordinate with their peers from the other country. Border agents must fight smuggling; prevent 
cross-border infiltration of rebels and criminals, and deter illegal immigration. It is a dynamic 
and fast-paced law enforcement job made extra challenging by having to interface with peers 
from another jurisdiction (Carter and Goemans 2011). Gavrilis provides rich historical analysis 
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of successful and unsuccessful border management along the Greek-Turkish border. However, 
his theory of the causes of border mismanagement receives no systematic analysis. Thus, it is 
difficult to know the representativeness of the Greek-Turkish cases. However, Gavrilis usefully 
demonstrates that states have multiple strategies they can employ when attempting to address 
crises along their borders.   
While the case study work focuses on the fact that states must choose from multiple 
potential management strategies, quantitative work examines the correlates of a single 
management technique: border fence construction.  Carter and Poast argue that states build 
border fences to staunch the flow of economic immigration (2017). They find that fences are 
rarely built as security fortifications. Nor are they designed to exclude refugees from neighboring 
countries embroiled in civil war. Carter and Poast thus argue that border fences are a 
manifestation of instability caused by citizens failing to respect a border and its accompanying 
immigration laws.  
Likewise, Hassner and Wittenberg argue that security concerns do not motivate states to 
build fences (2015). Their quantitative analysis finds no relationship between the existence of 
many territorial disputes and the erection of a fence. They also argue that terrorism does not fuel 
their construction. Instead, they find that border fence builders and targets are disproportionately 
Muslim-majority states. Echoing Carter and Poast’s economic findings, they observe that cross-
border wealth differences and economic immigration patterns encourage the construction of 
fences.  
However, border fences are only one method states have for stabilizing their borders, and 
it is a method that may be prohibitively expensive for many states to employ. Other strategies 
have received no systematic attention to date. I close this hole in the literature by introducing a 
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new dataset which records border closures between 1980 and 2011. This data will help resolve 
puzzles about why states employ border closures as a strategy, despite the cost and dislocation 
this tactic entails. While border fences are an important management technique, they are also a 
technique more likely to be employed by relatively high capability and wealthy states, due to 
their costs and technical challenges. Even in economically advanced countries near metropolises, 
building these fences is an expensive technical challenge. The United States spent between $16 
and $21 million per mile to build a primary fence near San Diego. Even in locations with 
relatively low labor costs, like Northern Africa, maintaining fences is not cheap. Spain spent 
approximately $6 million per mile renovating an aging boundary fence surrounding Melilla. 
These states’ challenges may not fully represent the breadth of possible sources of border 
instability.  Examining border closures allows a fuller understanding of how states, regardless of 
capacity, attempt to stabilize their borders. Studying how states chose between closing their 
borders and building walls is the first step towards understanding how states select management 
tactics from their portfolio of border control strategies.  Furthering this goal, my study provides 
the first quantitative assessment of multiple border control strategies. Below, I theorize that 
states match their border management tactics to the duration, efficacy, and cost-benefit 
implications of the crisis they face. 
Theory of Crisis Type and State Selection between Border Management Techniques     
     Why do states close their borders? Border crises and instability can stem from many 
sources including but not limited to smuggling, criminal activity, security threats both from 
states and non-state actors, illegal immigration and refugee displacement. I argue that states close 
their borders when confronted with neighboring civil wars. Civil wars tend to be relatively short, 
but intense crises. Therefore, states do not tend to rely upon more permanent border management 
 57 
techniques such as fortification and wall building. I develop this argument by explaining the 
differing nature of border challenges states confront. I outline the variety of strategies open to 
states to manage these challenges. Finally, I explain how different strategies are more or less 
effective and costly at addressing particular types of border instability. I argue that states match 
their chosen border management strategy to the duration, efficacy, and cost-benefit implications 
of the crisis they face.  
The Characteristics of Border Challenges: Duration and Intensity 
     To develop my theory that states chose their border management technique to align with 
the attributes of a border challenge, I first outline two prominent characteristics of border 
challenges: duration and intensity. After defining the concept of challenge intensity, this section 
develops a typology of crises. I then place several common border problems within this 
typological space.  
     States face international crises of varying intensity and duration. This truism also applies 
to border crises. Some border crises will be short and intense. For example, refugee troupes 
numbering in the tens or hundreds of thousands have flowed across borders within a single day. 
250,000 war-ravaged Burundians entered Tanzania seeking refugee through a single check point 
within a 24-hour period. Some border challenges will be long, but relatively moderate or even 
trivial. For example, cross border smuggling tends to be a hallmark of most borders, and is often 
not politicized into a full crisis provided border agents work effectively with their cross-frontier 
peers (Gavrillis 2008). Other border crises will be long and intense. Economic inequality tends to 
produce crises of long duration since structural economic differences are slow to equalize across 
borders. In fact, borders are a political institution in part designed to delay such equalization by 
opportunity hoarding within a single territorial jurisdiction.  
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Crisis intensity encompasses the concept that some challenges pose greater economic, 
military or political threat to a receiving state’s government. A challenge is a high intensity crisis 
if the government could lose power due to its continuation. A low intensity challenge does not 
imperil a state’s central authority. Challenges can fall anywhere between the extremes of no risk 
to the state’s government or its agents to risking the future existence of the state as an 
autonomous political unit.  
Figure 2: Border Management Tactic by Cost and Flexibility 
  Flexibility 
  High Low 
 
High Border Closure Border Fence 
Low No Change in Border 
Management 
Increase Number of Border 
Agents 
 
Figure 2 situates several types of typical border challenges in a two-dimensional space 
formed by the two core axes of duration and intensity. Duration and intensity are both plotted on 
a spectrum from low to high. The list is by no means exhaustive. Moreover, specific border 
crises of a single type may vary somewhat within the proposed space. For example, the massive 
Syrian refugee crisis would fall farther in the upper left quadrant than the relatively slow trickle 
of refugees leaving the Northern Triangle region of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala 
which would reside within the upper right quadrant. Instead, the figure points to general temporal 
and severity trends for particular forms of flow challenges. To build my theory that states match 
their border control tactics to the needs of a specific border challenge, I must next outline the 
characteristics of their management techniques. 
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The Characteristics of Border Management Techniques: Cost and Flexibility 
     Because challenges to a border can take several forms, states have developed several 
methods for combating them. States have a portfolio of foreign policy options available to them 
when managing a crisis or a disagreement (Keohane and Nye 1977; Gavrilis 2008; Weigandt 
2011). This is no less true when states face a significant disruption to the smooth and effective 
functioning of their borders. The collection of border management strategies forms a portfolio of 
border management strategies. Strategies within this state border management portfolio entail 
different benefits, weaknesses and costs. I argue that states tailor their response to the severity 
and length of challenges. To illuminate this tailoring process, I must first outline the strategies 
available to states and then rank them on their costs and flexibility. 
States possess four empirically observable border control strategies: three active and one 
passive. I discuss these strategies in order of least costly to most costly. First, states can choose 
to accept the status quo at the border, and not chart a major course correction in its management. 
This is the passive response to an extant border strain. Next, states can increase the number of 
guards and customs agents enforcing the border. This tactic adds more resources to support the 
state’s current daily practices at the border, but does not usually entail a radical reorientation of 
the border agents day-to-day mission. Next, states can close their border posts and turn traffic 
away en masse at crossings. This strategy fundamentally alters the norms at a border since the 
vast majority of states use their borders to regulate traffic but not fully stop flows. This strategy 
is costlier than the previous one since states forgo the positive benefits of flows to stop a 
particular negative type of traffic. It also entails political costs since border closings dampen 
economic activity on either side of the border. Therefore, a state that unilaterally shuts down 
traffic with a neighbor, risks worsening diplomatic relations with that neighbor. Jordan regularly 
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closed its border to travelers attempting to enter its country from Israel during the 1970s. In 
1981, Israel retaliated by closing down foreign entrance on its side of the border to keep 
Jordanians from asymmetrically reaping benefit from cheaper tourism to Jerusalem, Bethlehem, 
and Galilee. This action and reaction further soured relations between the countries over 
management of the West Bank. Finally, states can build border fences that substantially limit 
traffic across the border as well as focalize it to approved crossings. Like closing the border, this 
tactic has high opportunity costs by unintendedly limiting positive forms of flow. But it also has 
high realized costs. Placing barriers along miles of territory, often located in remote and 
inhospitable places is no small task. Fences require state capacity and financing to build. These 
are pure strategies designed to highlight their ideal types, though some mixing also likely occurs. 
Cost is only one metric along which these tactics diverge. They also vary in ease of 
switching to another available tactic. Border fences are the longest lasting and least flexible 
tactic. Though they will decay over time if not maintained, that is a slow process. For states to 
abandon fencing, they have to invest additional resources to remove it (though in the only two 
notable cases of border fence removal during the 20th century--the Berlin Wall and Panama 
Canal Fence--disgruntled citizens tore down these walls.) Adding additional border agents is also 
a medium to low flexibility tactic. While states can always fire guards and customs agents, in 
practice most bureaucracies do not contract once expanded (Niskanen 1975; Ehrenberg 1973; 
Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Dunleavy 2014). Bureaucrats have significant incentives 
to defend their budgets and often benefit from asymmetric information when bargaining with 
political sponsors (Banks and Weingast 1992). These processes make drawing down border 
enforcement difficult once enacted. Border closures can vary from a day to years. However, 
almost all closures are of fairly short duration. Most are closed between a day and a few months. 
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Since most closures are treated as temporary measures to restrict a flow or pressure a neighbor 
into changing policy and the closing state always retains the ability to reopen their side’s 
crossings, border closures are a highly flexible tactic. Finally, states can choose to do nothing, 
though they always have the option of adopting one of the other three tactics. Therefore, this 
strategy usually involves a wait-and-see approach to border management, rather than embarking 
on an immediate change in border management. This strategy is thus the most flexible posture 
from which states can reassess.  
 
Figure 3 presents a 2x2 typology that characterizes strategies by their costliness and 
flexibility. Cost and flexibility are both broken into two categories: high and low. The strategy of 
maintaining the status quo is the least costly and most flexible. By contrast, building a fence is 
the costliest and least flexible strategy. Hiring border guards represents a relatively low cost, but 
inflexible strategy due to the inelasticity of bureaucratic expansion. Finally, border closings 
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represent a high cost and high flexibility tactic. The next subsection explains how the 
characteristics of border challenges and border strategies interact, and explains why state’s 
carefully match their tactics to address the quality of challenge they face.  
Why States Match Strategies to the Intensity and Duration of a Challenge: 
     This section outlines how state’s match their strategies to the intensity and duration of a 
challenge. I argue that a mismatch between a selected tactic’s costs and flexibility and a 
challenge’s intensity and duration produce inefficiency and possibly policy failure. States have 
strong incentives to choose a border management strategy that sufficiently addresses a challenge, 
but that does not force the state to bear unnecessary costs or sacrifice more flexibility than 
required to stabilize the border.  
I argue that the cost states are willing to bear to manage a challenge reflects its intensity. 
If states spend a lot to address a low intensity problem, this is wasteful. Likewise, if states chose 
a low-cost tool for a high intensity problem, it is likely the crisis will fail to abate. Similarly, 
states have strong incentives to maximize their policy flexibility. This is doubly true at borders 
since border politics and problems are often dynamic. States will thus choose more flexible 
policies when dealing with shorter duration problems and will accept inflexible tactics when 
approaching a long-term crisis. Adopting an inflexible solution to a short-term problem limits a 
state’s future options and is an inefficient outcome. Likewise, long duration challenges often 
require long-term policies to limit their strain on the smooth functioning of a border. Thus, more 
flexible tactics are likely to be unsuccessful and wasteful. Figure 3 maps the optimal policy space 
for the four border strategies onto the stylized positioning of border challenges by intensity and 
duration. 
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Previous scholarship on border management has focused almost exclusively on 
explaining the phenomenon of border fencing. The principle finding that emerges from the 
border fences literature is that economics rather than security and the prevention of the diffusion 
of civil wars drives border management (Carter and Poast 2017; Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). 
Figure 3 argues that border fences emerge because economic crises are long ranging and intense. 
Moreover, figure 3 suggests that broadening our measures will help us better understand what 
drives shorter term, high intensity crisis responses. 
I argue that civil wars are an intense, but relatively short duration border crisis. 
Therefore, a state must employ a costly strategy to stabilize its border, but they need not sacrifice 
much flexibility. During a civil war, combatants and refugees both have strong incentives to 
violate the integrity of the border. Combatants cross international borders to forestall their 
pursuit by state forces (Saleyhan 2008). In addition to providing a safe haven during retreat, 
combatants crossing borders can often regroup and resupply before returning to the fray. These 
cross-border forays can inadvertently draw neighboring states into the conflict or trigger their 
own civil wars. Likewise, refugees fleeing combat will want to use the sanctuary that borders can 
create to limit their exposure to harm's way. However, refugees often flow into countries more 
quickly than they are willing or able to welcome them. States have a strong incentive to close 
their borders to slow or prevent both flows. States will use the high cost and high flexibility 
strategy of closing their borders in cases of civil war on the belief that such conflicts are 
comparatively short lived and dynamic in nature. While civil wars are dramatic, high cost crises, 
they are relatively shorter lasting than major structural economic differences between countries.  
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, the presence of a civil war in a neighboring country 
increases the probability of a border closure. 
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     Next, border closures are not more likely in the presence of economic inequality. This 
stems from the fact that economic inequality is a high duration problem. Therefore, states must 
adopt long-term durable solutions to resolve its impact on the border. Fully closing a border in 
this scenario would damage both countries’ economies substantially. Longer term border 
closures have been noted to cause famine and impoverishment along the border. Therefore, states 
will build fences instead. Fences limit illicit traffic by focalizing all flows to approved crossings. 
Flows continue to move across borders in the presence of border fences unlike with closures, 
explaining why states should prefer fences to closures when dealing with this form of crisis. 
Hypothesis 2: All else equal, the presence of economic inequality along a border should be 
unrelated to the probability of a border closure.  
This section has outlined a theory of the structure of border challenges. It suggests that 
border challenges vary along two dimensions: duration and intensity. It has also observed that 
border management tactics vary along two dimensions: cost and flexibility. It argues that states 
will match the appropriate strategy to the type of conflict, or inefficient outcomes emerge. 
Following this logic, despite previous research which has found that civil wars do not destabilize 
borders, I hypothesize that civil wars will be positively associated with border closures. 
Furthermore, I hypothesize that economic inequality will have no relationship with border 
closures. The next section outlines the data and methods to test this conjecture, and introduces an 
exciting new dataset on border closures.  
Research Design 
This section describes how I operationalized the concept of a border closure to produce 
an original dataset. It also highlights procedures for operationalizing variables derived from my 
hypotheses and alternative mechanisms. I include a full list of closure events in an appendix. 
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Moreover, it discusses how I address potential cofounders. Though states occasionally close their 
borders to non-contiguous states, as Pakistan closing its Iraq border to NATO members 
following a series of unauthorized drone strikes demonstrates, cases of this nature are a very rare 
exception rather than rule. Therefore, I focus on all contiguous state-to-state directed dyads as 
my unit of analysis. 
Measuring Border Closures 
I developed an original dataset of interstate border closures. I define a border as closed if 
a country’s central authorities prohibit the flow of people across an international frontier. A 
border closure is a visible diplomatic act. In the regular course of their duties, border guards 
occasionally shut down posts to address dangerous situations such as bomb scares or extreme 
weather. However, closures of this nature would not be included within the definition since these 
decisions are routine enough that a country’s political elite have delegated them down to low 
level functionaries. These shutdowns tend to be for a few hours and the main goal of guards is to 
safely re-establish the flow of traffic through a crossing. Moreover, since a state’s political 
leadership is uninvolved in these types of quick shutdowns, these disturbances lack diplomatic 
import. 
States sometimes shut their borders to certain products or industries as a form of 
economic protectionism or to prevent the spread of diseases that could ravage agriculture. For 
example, during a 2001 devastating outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease in the United 
Kingdom, several neighboring European countries banned the import of livestock or agricultural 
products from affected areas. Similarly, to buffer the U.S. long haul trucking industry, the United 
States delayed opening its borders to Mexican trucking companies for over twenty years despite 
agreeing to when it signed the North American Free Trade Act in 1994. However, protectionism 
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is a distinctly different phenomenon than the wholesale restriction of travel across interstate 
frontiers. Moreover, border agents still allow the vast majority of traffic through a border when a 
class of products is banned. Therefore, these cases are not included within the definition.  
     States sometimes close internal borders. This is especially likely during separatist 
conflicts. For example, Israel regularly isolates the West Bank and Gaza Strip regions to 
economically blockade the Palestinian people as well as limit cases of sectarian violence. These 
cases would be excluded by the definition’s focus on an interstate border since the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip are not internationally recognized states. However, Israel and Egypt have at times 
cooperated to close off these regions. Since both countries meet the commonly accepted 
definition of states employed within studies of international politics, Egypt closing its border 
with the Gaza strip would count as an event within the dataset. 
     Note, there is a distinction between tightening border controls and closing a border. 
Border controls are measures taken by a state to monitor and regulate cross-border flows. 
Tightening border control measures includes adding visa requirements to travelers from 
particular countries, increased searches of luggage and containers, as well as increasing tariffs. 
While these actions are designed to impact the flow of traffic across a frontier, they are not 
usually designed to prohibit it. Thus, cases where a state tightened but did not ban travel would 
not be incorporated within the analysis.  
     Using the above definition, I scoured a variety of sources to identify border closure 
events. Border closures are high profile diplomatic events that generally result from the souring 
of diplomatic relations between two countries. Thus, they are widely published by press outlets. 
Using LexisNexis, I coded every border closure reported by newspaper outlets between 1980 and 
2011. To collect relevant articles, I used the search terms “border closure” and “border closed” 
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and coded over 8,000 articles. An event is included within the dataset if at least two sources 
mention the closure. For cases, where only one newspaper appeared to have reported on the 
shutdown, I consulted various encyclopedia entries (especially for older closures). I validated 
this list by examining inter-coder reliability and comparing it to closure data from Anderson’s 
International Boundaries: A Geopolitical Atlas for available years (2003).  
Since I argue that measures of border instability will differ depending on the challenges 
states face, I run parallel models for my dependent variable as well as Carter and Poast’s border 
fence variable (2017). They track the presence of border fence within a dyad between 1800 and 
2014. Carter and Poast consider a border fence to be any man-made construction that denies 
entry of unwanted persons or things. 
I examine a pooled-cross section of directed dyads. Directed dyadic analysis allows me to 
untangle how characteristics of the possible border closure sending state and receiving state 
impact the likelihood that a border will be closed.  
Measuring Key Independent Variables 
     This paper aims to assess explanations for border closers. It also compares which 
explanations border closers and border fence construction share. To advance this comparability 
goal, I draw my independent variables from Carter and Poast’s study on fence erection. Below, I 
briefly explain data employed to examine hypotheses related to civil wars, economic inequality 
and territorial security. 
Civil Wars 
     I hypothesize that states will close crossings when dealing with shorter term challenges 
like refugee crises. To assess this hypothesis, I employ Uppsala Conflict Data Project’s indicator 
of civil war incidence (UCDP, Gleditsch et al. 2002). This variable only counts civil wars in 
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which at least 25 battle deaths per year occur. Since I am interested in how political instability in 
a neighboring country can encourage a closing country to shut its frontiers, I measure whether a 
civil war exists in countries neighboring a prospective border closer.  
Economic Inequality 
     Work on border fences finds that economic inequality is the driving factor shaping border 
destabilization. However, I hypothesize that it will not be associated with border closers. This is 
because economic inequality is a long-term problem which a short-term solution like temporarily 
shutting a border is unlikely to impact. Moreover, border closers have substantial negative 
effects on border region markets as demonstrated by famines and economic crises previously 
discussed. Thus, this “solution” would exacerbate cross-border income disparities. In line with 
Carter and Poast’s methodology, I focus on national level income inequality. Data on income 
inequality near border regions is only available for 4 select years and thus does not provide 
sufficient temporal coverage (Nordhaus et al. 2006). To assess the effects of cross border 
economic inequality, I employ the ratio of state A’s GDP per capita over state B’s income per 
capita. Using this dyadic measure, I can assess whether country A becoming increasingly 
wealthy raises the probability of country A closing its border on it is poorer neighbor. I take the 
natural log of this measure to adjust for the data being highly positively skewed.  
Territorial Disputes 
     To examine the possibility that border closures are a reflection of disputes over the 
location of a border rather than indicative of fixed border conflict, I include a measure of 
territorial disputes. Huth, Croco, and Appel (2011) update Huth and Allee (2002) population of 
territorial disputes between 1919 and 2010.  Moreover, territorial disputes are usually the most 
significant indicator of conflict between two countries. Therefore, the existence of such a dispute 
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within a dyad may indicate that states have military security reasons for considering closing their 
borders. 
Other Control Variables 
     In addition to the highlighted independent variables, I control for several possible 
confounding variables drawn from the literature. Authoritarian and democratic regimes handle 
their border politics very differently (Mitchell 2002, Huth and Allee 2002, Gibler 2012, James, 
Park and Choi 2006). Certain types of autocratic regimes are especially likely to militarize their 
borders. Moreover, refugee flows towards autocracies and democracies differ. While the 
commonsense wisdom is that most refugees seek asylum in democratic countries, most actually 
relocate to authoritarian regimes (Breunig, Cao, and Leudtke 2012). For example, Pakistan is the 
world’s largest refugee receiving country.  Finally, a measure of regime should account for 
differences in human rights practices which might increase available refugee stocks. To account 
for these differences, I employ several dyadic measures. I employ Polity IV to determine if a 
country is democratic (score greater than 6) or autocratic (score between 5 and -10) (Marshall 
and Jaggers 2002). Dyads are then broken down into pairs. A democratic closer/builder-
autocratic neighbor indicates that state A is democratic while the target state B is autocratic. The 
opposite is true for an autocratic closer/builder-democratic neighbor. Autocratic Dyad indicates 
that both states within a dyad have a Polity IV score less than 6. These are implicitly compared 
to mutually democratic dyads in all models.  
     Since Atzili theorizes that border fixity norms mean that states frequently do not attend to 
their periphery territories unless they are close to their capitals, I include a measure of capital-to-
capital distance within a dyad (2012). State with border regions close to their capitals are likely 
to be more concerned with border stability than states with capital far from crossings. Moreover, 
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distance impacts the flow of goods across borders (Tingerbgen 1962, Disdier and Head 2008) 
and therefore may impact state’s perceptions of the stability and management of those flows. 
     The military relationship between states within a dyad may also impact border stability. I 
include a variable that accounts for the ratio of military capabilities between two states. I draw 
this measure form the Correlates of War Composite Index of Military Capabilities (CINC) scores 
(Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). This measure is the natural log of a ratio of the stronger 
state’s CINC score over the weaker state’s CINC score. Most military capabilities reflect a 
state’s economic size. It is essential to ensure that my refugee and economic inequality measures 
are not a proxy for the balance of military capabilities.  
     Moreover, ally politics may impact state willingness to close borders. Allies generally 
enjoy relatively healthy diplomatic relationships and closing a border could sour an otherwise 
healthy repartee. I draw a measure of alliances from the Alliance Treaty Obligation and 
Provision data set (Leeds et al. 2002). This dummy variable is coded as 1 if two countries within 
a dyad share a formal alliance. 
Empirical Findings 
My results present compelling evidence that states are more likely to close their borders 
on a neighbor involved in a civil war, but that economic inequality does not prompt states to 
shutout their neighbors as hypothesized by the literature. First, I discuss border closures as a 
phenomenon of interest for students of border politics. Then I analyze the relative rates of border 
closures and the presence of a neighboring state with a civil war. Finally, I employ more 
sophisticated analytical techniques to help control for variables known to impact border politics. 
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Describing Border Closures 
     While not all states rely upon border closures, border closures are not exceptionally rare. 
States have closed their borders 546 times between 1980 and 2011. Relative to fence building, 
closures are a very common tactic for managing destabilizing flows. By comparison, states have 
only erected 62 walls in over 200 years (Carter and Poast 2015, 10). Border closures have also 
occurred on every continent except Antarctica. Figure 4 maps the number of times a country has 
been a border closer during the analysis period. It demonstrates that the vast majority of 
countries have closed one of their borders on a neighbor at least once. Darker colors indicate that 
a country has closed a border more frequently between 1980 and 2011. I constructed color 
buckets by finding the mean as well as first, second, third standard deviations, and outlying high 
observations.  Countries closed their borders an average of 2.79 times during the observation 
period. Figure 4 also highlights that some counties habitually initiate border closures. The most 
active border closures have been Iraq (42 closures), the Democratic Republic of Congo(33), 
Israel(23) and China(25).  
Figure 4: Border Closure By Initiator  
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Figure 5 plots the number of times a country has been targeted by a border closure. Color 
brackets were constructed using the same method described in figure 4. It shows that most states 
have had their border targeted by a neighbor’s closure at least once. However, it also highlights 
that many closures target a small subset of countries rather than closures targeting being evenly 
dispersed among countries. The countries which have experienced the most closure targeting are 
Iraq(22), Syria(15), Jordan(15), and Afghanistan(15).  
Figure 5: Border Closure by Target 
 
The frequency of border closures have also varied substantially over time. Figure 6 
graphs the number of closure initiations by year. The spikiness of the graph demonstrates clear 
year-to-year variation. However, an upwards moving time trend is also apparent. Almost half the 
number of closures occurs in the last decade of the available data, leaving the remaining half of 
closures in the first two thirds of the recorded time. Moreover, 2011 posted the highest number 
of closure events in a single year. Likewise, duration of closure is also highly variable. States can 
close their borders for as little as a day or as long as 51 years (North Korea-South Korea).  
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A First Cut of the Data 
Table 1 presents a cross tabulation of border closure and a neighbor within a direct dyad 
experiencing a civil war. It demonstrates that a state is more than twice as likely to close its 
border on a neighbor experiencing a civil war than on a neighboring state not experiencing this 
form of domestic strife. This is consistent with my primary hypothesis that civil wars prompt 
neighboring states to shut their border crossings.  
 
 
Table 1: Cross-border Civil War and Border Closures 
 Country A Does Not Close Border Country A Closes Border 
No Civil War in Country B 98.2% 
N=34,487 
1.75% 
N=616 
Civil War in Country B 96.35% 
N=7,000 
3.65% 
N=265 
Note:  This relationship is statistically significant at the p≤0.001 level (Chi-square with one degree of 
freedom = 105.909, p=0.000). 
 
 
Table 2: Cross-border Income Inequality and the Closure of a Border 
 GDP per capita Ratio 
 High Low 
A. Median as cut point 
Percentage of observations with closed border 
1.73% 
N=444 
2.96% 
N=494 
B. Seventy-fifth percentile as cut point 
Percentages of observations with closed border 
1.68% 
N=289 
2.57% 
N=649 
Note:  Difference in Panel A and B is statistically significant at the 0.99 confidence interval in a 
two-sided t-test.  
 
The literature predicts that increased economic inequality should lead to border 
destabilization. Therefore, more border closures may occur when there are high amounts of 
inequality across a frontier. Table 2 compares the rate of closed borders with differences in 
income inequality, employing a median cutpoint for high GDP per capita difference in one 
instance, and in the second panel a cutpoint at the 75th percentile to indicate “high” income 
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inequality. Panel A in Table 2 demonstrates that dyads with a GDP per capita ratio above the 
median produce a rate of border closure that is 58 percent lower than the rate of closed borders 
for dyads with below median ratios of GDP per capita. Likewise, Pane B in Table 3 relates the 
differences in GDP per capita to the existence of a border closure when the cutpoint for a “high” 
income inequality ratio is set to the seventy-fifth percentile (0.06). Dyads with GDP per capita 
ratios above the seventy-fifth percentile create a rate of border closure that is 65 percent lower 
than the rate of closed borders for dyads with ratios below this threshold. Contrary to literature-
derived expectations, a naïve comparison of both panels indicates that a lower GDP per capita 
ratio is associated with border closures. Unlike fence building, wealthy states do not close their 
borders on their significantly poorer neighbors.  
Multivariate Analysis 
Confounders may complicate these relationships. Cross-tabulations are also a poor tool 
for comparing the explanatory power of competing explanations. Multivariate analysis 
counteracts these shortfalls. I estimate several logit regression models to assess whether the 
presence of a civil war in a neighboring country increases the probability a state will close its 
borders. I compare these findings to models of fence building, highlighting how measurements 
of border instability greatly impact a researcher’s conclusions.  I include models with dyadic 
fixed effects to ensure that estimates derive from within-dyad variation, rather than cross-dyad 
variation. However, fixed effects drops observations in which there was never a border closure. 
It also eliminates observations for which a border has been closed for all sampled years. This is 
because estimating fixed effects requires dyads with temporal variation in the outcome variable 
(King 2001). I also employ random effects logit models because this form captures unobserved 
heterogeneity between groups without removing dyads lacking variation in the dependent 
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variable (King 2001). While fixed effects drops observations and thus reduces statistical power, a 
random effects model also has an important trade off.  These models assume exogeneity between 
the observed covariates and the dyad-specific intercept. I present naïve, random effects, and 
fixed effects logit models to increase the reader’s confidence that model selection does not alter 
my findings. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Directed Dyadic Tests of Theories of Border Instability as Measured by Border 
Closures and Fences 
 Border Closure Presence Border Fence Presence 
 Model 1 Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 5 Model 
6 
Neighbor Civil War 0.259.004 
(0.090) 
0.2520.030 
(0.116) 
0.2120.072 
(0.118) 
-
0.4590.004 
(0.16) 
-1.876<0.001 
(0.286) 
-
1.935<0.001 
(0.298) 
Directed Income Inequality -0.046.395 
(0.048) 
-
0.0720.212 
(0.057) 
-
0.0740.209 
(0.059) 
1.32<0.001 
(0.109) 
1.681<0.001 
(0.132) 
1.641<0.001 
(0.130) 
Territorial Disputes 1.104<0.001 
(0.092) 
0.7930.002 
(0.254) 
0.2450.441 
(0.317) 
1.955<0.001 
(0.124) 
1.1660.010 
(0.454) 
0.4660.403 
(0.557) 
Democratic Closer/Builder- 
Autocratic Neighbor 
1.195<.0.001 
(0.132) 
1.169<0.001 
(0.184) 
0.968<0.001 
(0.196) 
1.287<.001 
(0.181) 
0.5540.076 
(0.312) 
0.2200.497 
(0.324) 
Autocratic Closer/Builder- 
Democratic Neighbor 
1.093<0.001 
(0.135) 
0.4930.011 
(0.195) 
0.1840.375 
(0.207) 
0.793<0.001 
(0.197) 
-0.6880.071 
(0.381) 
-
1.1130.009 
(0.427) 
Autocratic Dyad 1.261<0.001 
(0.122) 
1.161<0.001 
(0.193) 
0.6650.002 
(0.216) 
0.5610.002 
(0.183) 
-0.3900.299 
(0.376) 
0.8240.048 
(0.417) 
Log of Distance -0.0350.465 
(0.047) 
-
0.1110.454 
(0.148) 
 -
0.496<0.001 
(0.046) 
-0.2690.473 
(0.375) 
 
Allies 0.2590.002 
(0.085) 
0.2360.145 
(0.162) 
0.2060.277 
(0.19) 
-
0.1620.204 
(0.128) 
0.9270.001 
(0.289) 
1.0600.001 
(0.307) 
Capability Ratio -0.0850.003 
(0.029) 
-
0.1820.016 
(0.075) 
0.1750.256 
(.154) 
-
0.143<0.001 
(0.033) 
-0.8040.001 
(0.234) 
-
1.234<0.001 
(0.334) 
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Constant -
4.982<0.001 
(0.359) 
-
6.399<0.001 
(1.071) 
 -
2.303<0.001 
(0.307) 
-
12.631<0.001 
(2.745) 
 
Dyad Random Effects No Yes No No Yes No 
Dyad Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes 
N 27405 27405 8189 27405 27405 1324 
Notes: two-tailed p-values in italicized superscripts, standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Table 3 shows the results of directed dyadic models for both closing border and fence 
building. Models 1-3 use the binary dependent variable of border closure, which is coded 1 if 
state A closed its border with State B in year t and zero otherwise. I compare these results to 
Carter and Poast’s findings concerning the presence of a border wall. Models 4-6 employ a 
binary dependent variable coded 1 if a wall exists between States A and B in year t and zero if 
not. Models 1 and 4 are pooled models with no dyadic-specific fixed effects. Model 2 and 5 
include random effects. Finally, model 3 and 6 rely upon fixed effects.  
My key theoretical variable of interest is the effect of a civil war within country B on 
country A’s likelihood of closing its shared border. Table 3 demonstrates that civil war in a 
neighboring state is positively and significantly associated with border closures. This is true even 
in the fixed effect model, though the significance level drops to the p<0.1 level due to the 
substantial reduction in sample size associated with this technique. Model 1 substantively shows 
that if country B moves from not having civil war to becoming embroiled in internal conflict, the 
odds that country A closes its border increases by 29.6%.  
Contrary to previous findings on border instability, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between cross border income inequality and the wealthier state closing its border. 
Moreover, across all model specifications, the negative coefficient runs counter to the border 
stability literature’s current hypotheses. The direction of the coefficient weakly implies that 
states are less likely to close their borders as a neighboring state gets relatively poorer. However, 
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Carter and Poast’s Models 4-6 provide strong evidence that cross border economic inequality is 
an important predictor of the presence of a border wall. The divergence between Models 1-3 and 
4-6 suggests that researchers should carefully select their metrics when including border 
instability within their models. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that states will 
chose different strategies when dealing with short term crises as opposed to long term challenges 
like economic differences.  
Models of the border closure and border fence dependent variables provide some, though 
inconsistent support for the notion that territorial disputes impact border instability. I can draw 
no statistically significant conclusions from both fixed effects model. This implies that when a 
dyad has a territorial dispute, the closer/builder state is more likely to close a border or create a 
wall. However, the presence of a territorial dispute is not a great predictor of whether a border 
will remain closed or a border wall stay in place. While a security rationale cannot be fully 
discounted, civil war more consistently predicts border closures and economic inequality more 
reliably forecasts border fences.  
Confounding variables behave largely as expected regardless of choice of border 
instability measure, though statistically significance varies across model specification. The 
models consider the effect of joint regime type on border management by dividing joint regime 
type into three variables: democratic builder/closer-autocratic neighbor, autocratic 
closer/builder-democratic neighbor, and mutual autocratic dyad. Remember: the comparison 
case is mutually democratic dyads. The results from Models 1-3 suggest that all forms of regime 
type are willing to close their borders on neighboring states in crisis. However, Models 4-6’s 
findings imply that democracies are more consistently likely to build fences on autocratic 
neighbors than autocrats on democracies and mutual autocracies. Though not significant across 
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all specifications, the distance between capitals and capabilities ratios are generally negative. 
Allies is the only other variable of note when comparing Models 1-3 and 4-6. It is only 
sporadically significant, but it indicates that allies are more willing to close a border on a 
neighbor in crisis, while less likely to build a fence. This softly suggests that states might select 
weaker border management strategies when dealing with allies. 
I run a number of robustness checks and also drop potentially influential closing 
countries and target countries to ensure that my results are not shaped by the behavior of a few 
outliers. Dropping countries both individually and as a group has no substantive impact on my 
findings. Interestingly, Israel appears to behave differently from most of the border closing 
countries in the sample. Dropping Israel from the analysis, strengthens my finding. This likely 
stems from the fact that much of Israel’s external border closures attempt to manage an internal 
conflict over the Palestinian territories.  
Conclusion 
Previous work on border fences has helpfully turned the discipline towards considering 
the politics of how states manage their border flows. The literature finds that economic 
inequality is the primary factor undermining the good functioning of international borders. 
However, this is incomplete on theoretical as well as empirical grounds. I broaden the range of 
border control tactics to include a spectrum of actions from doing nothing, to adding more 
guards, to closing a border, and finally, to building a border fence. I correct for past studies of 
border control that truncate management techniques by examining only one border control 
technique.  
While previous studies of border instability have ruled out civil wars as a cause, I find 
that civil wars are strongly associated with border closures. I also observe that economic 
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inequality is not associated with border closures, in contrast to its previously discovered strong 
association with fence-building. I provide a single theoretical framework that compellingly 
explains why states close their borders during civil wars but not in the face of economic 
disparity. I argue that states adapt their control practices to the duration and intensity of their 
border challenge. States accomplish this by embracing a border strategy with the necessary cost, 
flexibility, and efficacy to solve the crisis. 
     Beyond providing important insights into the study of border control regimes, I also 
introduce a new dataset on border closures. Closed borders are a common precursor to the 
emergence of more serious territorial conflict between states. Since border closures presage other 
types of disputes, this data and future tracking of closing borders provides a potentially useful 
early warning system on the development and escalation of conflict internationally. Milton 
Friedman famously argued, “The ultimate goal of positive science is the development of a 
‘theory’ or, a ‘hypothesis’ that yields valuable and meaningful (i.e. not truistic) about phenomena 
not yet observed” (1953). International Relations has consistently fallen short of this goal. Being 
able to better predict the emergence of conflict gives leaders more opportunities to negotiate 
down tensions before they boil over into war or produce enduring rivalries.  
     Treating border closures as an early warning for the development of more serious 
disputes also has implications for the research community. How states select into territorial 
disputes is an open question within the territorial claims agenda (Huth 1996). Statistical studies 
of territorial disputes and their escalation largely fail to account for these selection effects 
because correctly identifying non-events for territorial claims remains problematic. Since states 
choose which lands to claim and which territorial demands to negotiate away, strategic censoring 
endemically effects statistical models of territorial conflict. Factors driving border closures also 
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likely drive territorial claims making and escalation. Yet border closures are a relatively cheaper 
and early step along the path towards territorial claims emergence. This new data on border 
closures provides a new resource for scholars to examine territorial dispute emergence. 
Moreover, two-step models that employ border closures as a selection mechanism in the first 
stage, may improve inferences about territorial dispute escalation.  
Figure 2 places several types of crisis along an idealized space defined by the duration 
and intensity of the crisis. Future research should examine how states manage different types of 
border challenges. First and foremost, incorporating border closure data should advance the 
terrorism research agenda. The field has produced many studies that predict when terrorism 
emerges (Kydd, Andrew and Walter 2006; McCormick 2003; Lee 2011; Hegghammer 2013; 
Pape 2003; Wade and Reiter 2007; Li 2005), when state policy succeeds or fails to address 
terrorism (Bueno de Mesquita 2005; 2007; Walsh and Piazza 2010; Azam and Thelen 2010; 
Powell 2007; Dragu 2011), and the political impacts of terrorism (Berrebi and Klor 2008; Carter 
2012; Abrahms 2012; Kibris 2010). However, the war on terror framework has had an outsized 
impact on this field. Many studies focus on militarized tactics for dealing with this threat. 
Focusing on non-militarized ways states mitigate terrorism would provide a helpful corrective to 
this trend.  
     While the current refugee crisis in Europe and cascade of border closures likely has 
significant effects on the welfare of refugees as well as the distribution of aid provision in 
refugee hosting, no current research exists to fully assess the implications of border closures as a 
tactic. Future research should thus focus on the effects of border closures. This paper has posited 
that these effects could be highly negative, at least in border regions, based on some anecdotal 
evidence. However, a more systematic analysis may help refugee advocates and leaders 
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concerned about border management develop more humane policies that could benefit Syrians, 
host countries, and future refugee groups. Likewise, research should focus on the impacts of 
other border management techniques, since explaining the emergence of border management 
tactics has been the sole focus of the research agenda to date.  
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PAPER 3 
 
CLOSED BORDERS, OPEN PALMS: 
THE REFUGEE-HOSTAGE DILEMMA  
 
Introduction: 
 
Although Syria’s civil war has caused inestimable suffering, scholars and commentators 
seek to quantify the pain experienced by the Syrian people. The number of refugees pouring out 
of the country in a desperate attempt to escape commonly serves as a proxy. The United Nations 
estimates 4.8 million people sought refuge across the region. More have elected the dangerous 
trek to find sanctuary in Europe. Some European countries have been exceptionally welcoming 
to the massive flood of refugees. Despite the crisis taxing Germany’s infrastructure, Angela 
Merkel has held the door firmly open to all arriving Syrians,  saying, “The fundamental right to 
asylum for the politically persecuted knows no upper limit; that also goes for refugees who come 
to us from the hell of a civil war” (quoted in ABC News 2015). However, other countries have 
not been so consistently obliging.  
Macedonia has closed its borders to migrating war victims on several recent occasions. 
Refugees escaping Syria often first pass into Turkey. However, Turkey only allows refugees to 
seek temporary protection. Many refugees thus try to enter Europe, hoping for access to more 
permanent safety. From Turkey, they cross the Aegean Sea in makeshift, over-filled boats with 
poor or no safety equipment. Once in Greece, the refugees make an overland journey across 
several countries, including Macedonia, to reach Germany. While Macedonia officially allows 
Syrians to pass through its borders if their final destination is Germany, in practice, they often 
bar the way. It first halted admittances briefly in August 2015. In November 2015, Macedonia 
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erected a border fence along its Greek border. In early December 2015, it formally closed its 
border posts for two days, and returned to closure during late January 2016. Presently, the way 
has been closed since March 2016.  
Knowing these refugees sought protection in wealthy, welcoming countries such as 
Germany, Sweden, or the Netherlands, why did Macedonia deny them passage? This paper will 
explore how states use border controls to address refugee flows. It will attempt to address an 
empirical puzzle: why do some states close and reopen their borders to refugees multiple times 
throughout a single crisis?  
Understanding how states control their borders during a crisis remains crucial within 
International Relations scholarship. The influx of refugees from neighboring countries represents 
one of the challenges border agents and state leaders face. Refugee flows can tax a receiving 
country’s resources. Refugees, and the governments which accept them, often elicit the ire of 
substantial portions of the receiving country’s population. Extraterritorial fighters can 
masquerade as refugees, threatening to expand a conflict to include the receiving country. 
Refugee-accepting states thus present a puzzle for students of state behavior. If refugee flows 
threaten the domestic tranquility of a receiving state, why do states ever accept people fleeing 
neighboring conflicts? 
Work on this question focuses on the emergence of a refugee protection norm. Under this 
humanitarian norm, states have a moral obligation to aid those fleeing conflict, even if to do so 
proves costly. The “refugee protection norm” has been enshrined in international and domestic 
legal frameworks. Other scholars have noted that states may be more willing to bear the costs of 
hosting refugees when coethnic ties exist between the fleeing group and the receiving country. In 
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contrast to proponents of a universal humanitarian norm, coethnic explanations suggest that a 
narrower humanitarian impulse drives states to welcome displaced people.  
In either case, arguments that focus on the negative effects of hosting refugees and the 
normative pressure to do so miss a key empirical fact. States sometimes open and shut their 
doors multiple times during the same conflict. Much media attention on closures focuses on the 
apparent negative externalities associated with housing or helping transport refugees, but these 
negative externalities exist continuously. Likewise, international legal protections and strong 
norms against refoulment—forcing a refugee back into a dangerous situation by expelling them 
from a host country—have existed since at least the 1950s. Even coethnicity ties do not vary 
within a single crisis. Therese continuous conditions insufficiently explain the discontinuous 
patterns of border closure and re-opening observed over various modern conflicts.  
When a host country rejects refugees, it rarely acts from a pure desire to avoid the 
downsides of protecting war-weary people. Moreover, when it accepts refugees, its impulses 
may not be purely humanitarian. This paper argues that greed may fuel some states’ refugee-
border policies.  
In a refugee-supportive norms environment with wealthy international donors, states have 
an incentive to hold refugees hostage for increased aid flows. This aid can take several forms. At 
its crudest, a receiving government may demand a direct cash transfer to open the border—as 
Turkey did after closing its Bab al-Salameh crossing with Syria in 2016, and Uzbekistan did in 
2010. Governments might also seek to benefit from international technical aid or infrastructure 
projects. Refugee hosts often strategically locate refugee camps to promote development in 
poorer regions of their country as Kazakhstan did in 2010. By demanding more roads, hospitals, 
and schools, a host can spur the economic integration of an undeveloped region. 
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Use of local contractors and NGOs to provision services also functions as a potential 
avenue of profit for receiving nations. Most international donors eschew local contractors 
precisely to avoid transforming aid into a source of rent seeking for host governments. However, 
some host countries successfully demand that the international donor community work with local 
agencies. For example, Chad has leveraged intermittent border closures to encourage the 
international donor community to work with local Chadian partners in the provision of some aid 
since 2014.  
Some states thus close their borders to displaced people until they can extract additional 
aid revenue from the international community. No current scholarly work examines how 
receiving countries manipulate border closure to moderate or even benefit from refugee flows. 
This paper fills that gap in the literature. 
My argument develops in five parts. First, I examine relevant studies of refugee policy 
and border control policies. Next, I introduce a game theoretic model demonstrating the 
interaction between an international donor and possible refugee host states. I also discuss case 
selection strategy. Afterwards, I examine the empirical implications of the proposed model in 
two modern case studies: Tanzania’s border controls and refugee policy during the Burundian 
civil war and Rwandan Genocide, as well as Macedonia’s border policy during Kosovo’s refugee 
crisis. I conclude with a discussion of potential solutions to the dilemma I identify, and point the 
way towards future research extensions.  
Origins of Variation in Refugee Policy 
International Security scholars have focused on the destabilizing nature of refugees. 
Refugees account for some dispersion of civil war across borders (Weiner 1996, Salehyan and 
Gleditsch 2006). They can support or provide justification for violent third-party interventions in 
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civil wars (Salehyan 2009; Gelditsch et al. 2008). Refugees can also impact domestic politics and 
cause backlash within receiving states (Keely and Russell 1994; Cornelius et al. 2004). Because 
not all countries are equally able to request aid or integrate influxes of refugees with their 
populations, refugees are often seen as costly to keep, potentially destabilizing to job markets, 
and (sadly) a threat to the cultural fabric of the receiving country.  Karen Jacobson finds these 
factors can impact refugee policy substantially (1996; Crisp 2000; McBride 1999; Bloch 2008).  
If refugees are so dangerous and destabilizing to host, why do receiving countries accept 
them at all? The literature largely focuses on the force of international law and humanitarian 
normative considerations as compellents, pushing states to host refugees (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998; Jacobson 1996; Cortell and Davis 1996). The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees enshrined non-refoulment within International Law. Non-refoulment is the legal 
responsibility not to expel refugees into jurisdictions where they might be killed or persecuted 
(Goodwin-Gil and McAdam 2007). However, signatory states vary in their willingness to accept 
refugees. For example, while some gulf Arab states have refused to accept Syrian refugees, 
Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon have been welcoming to those affected by Syria’s civil war. 
 Gibney explores several hypotheses to explain interstate variation in refugee hosting: differences 
in the cost of hosting, the health of a potential host country’s economy, its integration history, its 
population, and the actions of other states (1999). Domestic political variation and media 
attention within a possible host country also help to explain variation in refugee acceptance 
(Salehyan and Rosenblum 2008). Likewise, diplomatic and military affinity with the country of 
origin may also explain why some states only selectively refuse refugees (Salehyan and 
Rosenblum 2004; Loescher 1993).  
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Another important factor influencing refugee policy is the role of international third-party 
aid. Housing refugees can be expensive. International organizations and leading developed 
nations often provide aid to host countries to offset costs. The donor community sometimes gives 
cash transfers to hosting countries, or offers preferential loans to incentivize host states. More 
commonly, donors provide technical aid and build capital projects within a host country. For 
instance, UNHCR aid largely takes the form of managing refugee camps and addressing refugee 
health and welfare needs. As an externality, its camp projects may also benefit locals by better 
integrating underdeveloped border regions with the host country’s capital.  
Balla and Reinhardt find that countries bordering a conflict receive increased aid while 
countries in conflict receive less (2008; Bruck and Xu 2012). But this work focuses on the 
behavior of donors exclusively. Aid receiving states are not seen as agents within models of 
bilateral peace aid. This paper addresses a weakness in the literature by examining one possible 
strategy host states use to increase their aid when dealing with refugees. Namely, receiving 
countries threaten not to host refugees until they secure larger aid flows.  
Bordering on Refugees: Border Management and Conflict 
 
Past Political Science research into borders has largely fixated on when states fight over 
the location of borders (Vasquez 1993; Kocs 1995; Diehl 1999; Hensel 2000; Senese 2005; Huth 
and Allee 2002; James, Park and Choi 2006; Mitchell and Hensel 2007). More recently, an 
emerging new school examines how states manage their fixed borders, and how these 
management techniques can exacerbate conflict or cement peace. Border Institutionalists posit 
that important patterns of state behavior and conflict are unintelligible without accounting for the 
often long-ranging impact of having lines on maps, even when those lines are long-uncontested. 
Borders themselves can facilitate peace, or disputes simply by existing. While Carter and 
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Goemans find that the presence of past administrative frontiers act as a focal point in negotiating 
new frontiers (2011; 2014), Abrahamson and Carter note that multiple historical jurisdictions 
near a border produce more territorial disputes, because the involved states do not share a 
coordinated vision (2016).    
The Institutionalist Approach has fruitfully enriched this field’s understanding of 
territorial dispute settlements. Simmons notes that well-functioning borders offer substantial 
economic advantages by reducing uncertainty, minimizing transaction costs, and limiting the 
negative externalities disputes produce (2005). The Institutional Approach adds dimension to the 
study of territory and conflict by noting that states bargaining over land do not necessarily play a 
zero-sum game. Dispute resolution and properly functioning, mutually agreed upon borders 
provide joint gains.  
In addition its clarification of key territorial questions, the Institutional Approach has also 
addressed the effect of border management on non-territorial disagreements. Carter and Poast 
assert that states fortify existing borders with walls to protect themselves from the effects of 
extreme economic inequality (2015). Likewise, Gavrilis argues that effective border 
management1 emerges when states mutually decentralize their control of borders and empower 
their border agents to work cooperatively across the line (2009). The Institutionalist Approach 
has even helped illuminate new patterns in the study of International Relations’ only robust 
systematic law: that mutual democracy effectively stifles the emergence of war within a dyad as 
territorial peace may proceed the emergence of democratic regions and their contingent peace 
(Gibler 2009).  
                                                 
1 Gavrilis defines “effective border management” as better controls of flows of goods and people and 
fewer diplomatic incidents. 
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Yet, the Institutionalist Approach to borders remains a burgeoning field of inquiry. Now 
that it has established its relevance by addressing key territoriality questions, and shown that 
conflict can emerge over fixed borders, more scholarship should examine the causes and effects 
of fixed border conflict. This paper begins to fill that gap by addressing the effects of refugee 
flows and international aid on border management. 
The next section develops a model simulating a receiving state’s border policy when 
facing a refugee crisis. It notes that humanitarian-influenced donors can be coerced into 
providing more funds to a receiving state. Receiving states close their borders to refugees to 
bargain for a more favorable aid allocation.  
Refugee-Hostage Dilemma: Model and Methods 
 
This section develops a model of refugee-host border management with benevolent third-
party aid. The model’s equilibrium state reveals a striking fact: receiving states sometimes have 
an incentive to close their borders on those escaping war and strife. This incentive is strongest 
when aid agencies are most concerned with humanitarian outcomes. Thus, a dilemma emerges. 
Aid agencies that most want to help refugees and accepting countries may unintentionally 
encourage their use as hostages in an international bargaining game. Border closures, even when 
they are relatively short, prolong refugee exposure to violence, oppression, and disease. 
Untempered humanitarian aims may thus produce inhumane border policy, creating a variation 
of the Samaritan’s Dilemma (Trosvik 2005).  
The Refugee-Hostage Dilemma develops because aid guarantors and aid recipients may 
have incompatible interests. In line with previous research, I assume that humanitarian goals 
motivate aid-giving states and institutions. Aid-providing states and agencies donate in order 
incentivize recipient countries to increase their refugee intake. They thus grant aid to offset the 
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costs of hosting refugees. Refugee-receiving countries’ aims are not so clear. They may share 
humanitarian impulses with donor countries, but they may also seek aid for non-humanitarian 
purposes. Host countries can thus extort funding from altruistic sources by passively threatening 
refugees. Border closure represents one example of passively endangering people fleeing conflict 
to garner more funding. Following the enumeration of the model’s formal logic, the section 
closes with a reflection on whether its theorized effects operate in the real world.  
 
The Model: 
 
Consider a two period model with a single donor and two possible host/aid recipient 
states. The budget constraints for state i in time period 1 and 2 are given below: 
 
 
In the first period, host country i allocates a given endowment w between domestic government 
spending, , and spending on refugee care, , where . Government i’s resources in the 
second period, , depends on the state of the world. Assume that if   in period 1, this 
represents the country i closing its borders to refugees. In period 2, the host government allocates 
between consumptive spending, , and aid spending . 
The state of the world can be good or bad with a known probability. Resources available 
to the state in the second period will be higher in the good state than the bad: . 
Therefore the government i’s resources in the second period can be represented as: 
 
 
Note, in a two-country model there are four possible aggregate states because the state of the 
world is independently determined for each country. This generalizing assumption further has 
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logical underpinnings. Namely, that the economic conditions favorable to one country need not 
necessarily enrich another country. The set of states is as follows: 
 
 
Let S represent this full set of possible states and, s, represent a specific combined realized state. 
 Assume donors give aid for refugee care due to humanitarian motives. From the 
humanitarian principle: donors desire to give more aid to the country least able to absorb 
refugees. Therefore, if a donor gave more aid to a state in a good condition than a state in a bad 
condition, this would be a suboptimal outcome.  Following Svensson’s example (2000), I 
conceptualize aid as a good or service, in period 2, used to benefit refugees and the receiving 
country’s poor. The production function for this aid is as follows: 
 
 
where h is an increasing, concave function and  is the level of humanitarian aid assistance 
country i receives. Refugees derive utility from the good which can be produced either from the 
donor’s or the host country’s resources. Total refugee consumption in host country i is 
 
 Host country i’s utility is an additive function consisting of its constant marginal utility 
from consumptive spending in the first period and total public spending in time 2, represented by 
: 
 
Assume monotonically increasing, concave host preferences.  
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The donor also has a budget constraint for supporting refugees. Let B represent their 
fixed funding endowment: 
 
 
where corresponds to the donor’s gift to country i when in a realized aggregate state s from the 
set of all possible aggregate states S. Assume that this budget is “use-it-or-lose-it” in nature. This 
assumption derives logically from the extensive literature on bureaucratic budgetary politics. A 
donor organization failing to spend its full budget demonstrates to its principals that it does not 
need as extensive budget and thus will receive less funding in the future. Bureaucratic 
organizations want to protect their budgets in case they have greater capacity needs in the future, 
and thus will spend rather than save a budget to keep consistently high or increasing funding 
levels.  
 
Host versus Benevolent Donor Refugee Aid Equilibria 
 
Backwards induction demonstrates that the ex post incentives of benevolent refugee 
agencies, and the ex ante incentives of receiving countries’ conflict. In period two, the donor 
dispenses aid between the two countries. Since the donor’s preferences are humanitarian in 
nature, these preferences are a combination of the total refugee consumption occurring in both 
countries. Setting the first derivative to 0 optimizes these preferences, giving: 
 
where  represents the total refugee consumption in country i, in a given state of the world 
and interstate refugee donations  at Nash Equilibrium in the last stage of the game.  By the 
principle of concavity, the first order derivative is the maximum rather than the minimum. Thus, 
second order conditions need not be calculated. The intuitive interpretation of the first order 
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condition is that interstate refugee support will go to the country presenting as most in need, ex 
post.  
The two host countries non-cooperatively divide their first period budget between 
domestic government spending and spending on refugee care. The equilibrium refugee donations 
represented by the previous equation then constrain each potential host country’s optimization. 
To optimize, I substitute the refugee donation flows into the host country utility function and 
differentiate with respect to the host country’s own refugee allocations: 
 
 
for  where  
 
In plain English, at this equilibrium, because the donor always wants to provide aid to the 
state least able to support refugees, states have an incentive to shift money from their own 
refugee support budgets towards other government projects. In extreme cases, this implies that 
the country with poorer economic health has an incentive to fully defund their own refugee 
sponsorship. Remember, when , the intuitive interpretation of this is that country i has 
closed its borders to refugees. Reality reflects this model choice; the mere act of processing 
refugee flows at a border incurs additional costs for the state. Costs stem from the additional 
hours border guards and customs agents work, as well as the cost of legal enforcement when 
customs agents find contraband on refugees. The border-closing state has clear incentive to 
endanger refugees for a period of time in order to extract more donor support. Donors pay states 
with closed borders more aid than they would otherwise, to coax recipient states to open their 
borders and remove refugees from dangerous conditions. The classic Samaritan Dilemma shifts 
into a Hostage Dilemma with the lives of refugees held in the balance. A purely humanitarian 
impulse on the part of donors may therefore have inhumane outcomes.  
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Methods, Case Selection, Empirical Implications of the Model  
To assess the empirical implications of my model, I adopt an analytical narratives 
approach (Bates et al. 1998). Combining rational choice approaches with historical analysis 
provides additional rigor to case study research. Formalizing the causal process at play 
encourages qualitative scholars to isolate key variables and mechanisms, and thus fosters more 
parsimonious analysis than traditional case-based research. This method also demands that the 
formal scholar contextualize their simple models with the messiness of actual politics.  
The analytic narrative approach becomes especially useful when the researcher is 
motivated by a limited number of highly salient cases (Bates et al. 2000). While there have been 
several instances of border closures between 1980 and the present (see Paper 2), as well as many 
refugee crises, the puzzle motivating this paper focuses on the effects of especially large-scale 
crises. Most refugee flows do not number in the hundreds of thousands or millions. Large-scale 
crises moreover pose special challenges to states.  
The approach, moreover, provides scholars with a way to theorize from a puzzling case, 
while drawing out implications that can be examined by elements of that case which did not 
originally motivate the research. Thus, a formal model allows both an in and out-of-sample case 
analysis. Analytic narrative techniques facilitate the disaggregation of single case into many 
observations by focusing on several separate empirical implications. However, the gold standard 
approach to analytical narratives still seeks out an additional case to serve as a truly out-of-
sample test. I adopt the technique of testing multiple empirical implications of my model within 
two cases to fully validate my model. 
Analytic narrative case selection focuses on substantively important or crucial cases, 
often the case which motivated the researcher’s original insight. I select two crucial cases: 
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Tanzania’s border policy during the Great Lakes Crisis and Macedonia’s border policy during 
the war in Kosovo. Both conflicts generated massive refugees flows that threatened to destabilize 
existing refugee protection norms and are thus good proxies for the current Syria emergency. In 
addition to being a crucial case, I select Tanzania because it represents a relative hard test of my 
theory due to presence of several compelling alterative explanations. By combing crucial and 
hard case analysis, I thus set a high bar for testing the implications of my model. 
I derive several falsifiable implications from my model. The first implication of the 
model is that funding concerns motivate a hosting country to shut their borders. Examining 
motivations in international relations is tricky due to its strategic nature. In addition to examining 
interview data and the actors’ own explanations for their actions, for each case, I compare 
whether host nation behaviors consistently reflect competing theoretical motives for border 
closure. If other motives predominate or financial motives seem implausible, the reader should 
reject my model.  
The next implication is that aid-receiving countries compete with other countries for a 
slice of a limited refugee aid pie. Explicit evidence of this competition can take several forms. 
States can attempt to shift hosting burden to other countries by arguing that the other country is 
more equipped to handle the influx. They may argue that it is costlier for their country to host a 
refugee than a competing country, as Turkey consistently has done when Kurdish regions 
produce refugee flows. They may actively scale back prior support for refugees to further bolster 
their claims. The model implies that only one country will be able to make these arguments 
especially effectively. Moreover, it predicts that the country that is more impacted by the conflict 
will be the border closer while the other country will find it difficult to shirk its responsibilities 
to refugees.  
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A sealed border must actively endanger refugees to trigger the donors’ humanitarian 
impulses. This implies that receiving states will maximize their bargaining leverage when 
violence is especially protracted and severe in the conflict-originating state. The hostage 
dilemma thus obtains more often during especially bad crises. Evidence for this hypothesis 
includes active endangerment of the fleeing population by the receiving state. In addition to the 
border closure itself (which should be discounted to avoid tautology), poor or violent treatment 
of arriving refugees corresponds with attempts to trigger the international humanitarian 
community’s sympathy. 
The final implication is that closing hosts will specifically link the border closure to 
funding demands. Failing to request more aid would demonstrate a lack of issue linkage. 
Moreover, the rejecting host should accept refugees after the international community pays its 
“ransom” demand. If the host demands more aid to open the border, receives the aid, and fails to 
open the border, this would endanger their credibility with the international community. A blow 
to reputation could potentially remove the host’s ability to make future funding demands. The 
iterative nature of international politics thus implies that paid ransoms will produce at least 
sporadically open borders.    
The next two sections examine the plausibility of this outcome in real world cases.  The 
first case examines Tanzania’s refugee policy during the early phases of Burundi’s long running 
civil war. The second case looks at Macedonia’s border policy during the Kosovo War.  
Case Study 1: Tanzania/Burundi-Rwanda Border Closures 
Tensions between Burundi’s Hutu and Tutsi populations turned violent after Tutsi 
extremists killed the country’s first Hutu president, Melchor Ndadaye. Between 1993 and 2006, 
Burundi and Rwanda erupted into civil war and genocide. Over 300,000 Burundians died during 
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this period. At the height of the conflict in 1995, Tanzania hosted 570,000 of the estimated 2.1 
million total refugees streaming from these two countries. The refugee crisis developed 
incredibly quickly. Marking the fastest, large-scale refugee exodus in history, 250,000 refugees 
crossed into Tanzania through a single checkpoint in just one day. 
While it allowed large numbers of refugees into the country, and maintained one of the 
most generous refugee policies throughout the early 1990s, Tanzania still closed its borders with 
Burundi and Rwanda intermittently several times through the conflict. Tanzanian leaders linked 
these closures to demands for more aid and burden sharing. However, the Tanzania-Burundi 
border closures of the mid-90s represent a hard case for the model. The model predicts that 
countries close their borders when bargaining with international donors. Tanzania represents an 
excellent case to compare the model’s predictions to several possible alternative explanations. 
Security concerns, both internal and interstate, could have motivated Tanzania to close its 
borders on Burundi (Brahim 1995; Milner 2000; Black 1998). It is possible that the magnitude of 
the crisis was too disruptive for Tanzania to accommodate (Whitaker 2008; Whitaker 2002; 
Long 2010; Rutwina 1996; Crisp and Jacobsen 1998). These explanations, on their face, seem 
more plausible than the model’s predictions, but will be demonstrated to be inconsistent with 
Tanzanian policy and behavior. This section will elaborate on potential counter-explanations, 
explain why they should be eliminated as viable causes of the border closures, and close with a 
discussion of the model’s implications.  
Hosting refugee populations can tax a government's security forces. The nature of the 
violence during the Great Lake Crisis was particularly difficult for refugee-accepting states to 
manage. Combatants regularly masqueraded among refugees seeking asylum. Both Hutu and 
Tutsi militias used the camps as bases to regroup before returning to the fray. Fighters hiding in 
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the camps attacked their fellow refugees, harming opposition leaders along with non-co-ethnics. 
In one notable case, Zaire hosted Tutsi refugee camps while its military forces allied with Hutu 
combatants. Zairian and Hutu forces attempted to ethnically cleanse the Tutsi camps. Tutsis in 
Zaire thus formed self-protection militias and retreated further from their Zairian hosts. 
Observing Zaire’s destabilization, Tanzania had strong security motives to deny refugees access 
to its territory.  
Moreover, the Tanzanian government linked the presence of well-armed refugees to an 
uptick in local crime in Western Tanzania, though the region was considered relatively lawless 
before the influx. Joseph Rwegasira, Tanzania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation, argued that refugees murdered 67 Tanzanians and stole property worth more than 
150 million shillings in the Kagera region alone (The Guardian[Tanzania] 1995). Responding to 
the influx of weapons within the country, Tanzania’s Home Affairs Minister, Ernest Nyanda, 
stated, “There is no government which will tolerate free entry of dangerous weapons likely to 
endanger the lives of its citizens,” (quoted in Inter Press Services 1995).   However, Johnson 
Brahim, a senior official in Tanzania’s department of refugees, noted that local Tanzanians were 
involved in a majority of crimes attributed to refugees (1995). In Kigoma, 38 local Tanzanians 
were murdered compared to 55 refugees, indicating that refugees also bore a significant brunt of 
any increased crime (ibid.). Upon closing its border with Burundi, Tanzania’s Prime Minister 
highlighted internal and external security motives: “The gravity of the situation, especially for 
those coming from Burundi and Rwanda, has made it inevitable for Tanzania to take appropriate 
security measures by closing her border with Burundi and Rwanda,”  (quoted in James C. 
Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 
2005).  
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However, regional experts have consistently noted that these fears were overblown, and 
acted as cover for Tanzania’s violation of the non-refoulment norm (Whitaker 2008; Rutinwa 
and Kamanga 2003). This suggests that Tanzanian leaders latched on to the security explanation 
in order to justify their controversial violation of international norms. They sought to appeal to 
another well-entrenched norm: that a state’s first duty is to defend its populace. Most damaging 
to an internal security account though, is Tanzanian policy before and after the border closures. 
If the security alternative explanation really accounts for the border closure, Tanzania should 
have implemented policies prior to the closure to mitigate these security concerns. Tanzanian 
policy demonstrated no such attempts.   
During both phases, Tanzania abdicated its policing and security responsibilities within 
the refugee camps. Rutinwa explains the government's position:  
...Asked to respond to charges that Tanzania was harboring armed elements in 
Burundian refugee camps in Tanzania, Mr Jakaya Kikwete, the Tanzanian 
Foreign Minister replied that Tanzania had no responsibility for whatever 
transpired in the camps...Refugee camps were “UNHCR Islands” in which the 
Tanzanian government had no role, apart from providing security around them! 
(2002, 88).  
 
Instead, it relied entirely on the UNHCR to secure the camps. Medecins Sans Frontieres situation 
reports from the time explain: “UNHCR does not want Tanzanian police inside the camp, which 
we understand, given their typical passivity” (1994). Tanzania also ignored pleas from Rwanda’s 
RPF government and human rights activists to arrest suspected leaders of the Rwandan genocide 
then living in Tanzania. Dr. Bernard Pecoul, executive director of MSF, observed: “The 
Tanzanian police are unable to arrest those people, clearly identified, who are responsible for the 
massacres.” Rutinwa and MSF situation reports indicate that Tanzania did not arrest a single 
person during the lead up to the border closures, despite having the legal authority to do so under 
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international law after correctly recognizing the conflict as a genocide.  The relinquishment of 
the state’s traditional policing responsibilities to the international community and aid 
organizations followed the well-established pattern in Tanzania of the government taking an 
increasingly hands off role towards refugees in the decade prior to the conflict. The international 
donor community reinforced this pattern by relying less and less on local partnerships in the 
provision of refugee aid. Given Tanzania’s passive police mobilization before and after the 
border closures, internal security explanations of the closure appear to provide empty 
justifications for endangering refugees. 
The Great Lake Crisis presented states with serious external security challenges. While 
Rwanda and Burundi burned, legitimate fears existed that the conflict would spread to 
neighboring countries. Research into the contagion effects of civil wars legitimates these 
concerns (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Braithwaite 2010; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). Fears 
of conflict diffusion could have been especially powerful motivators for border closure, 
especially given the Hutu and Tutsi militias’ use of refugee camps as bases to resupply, train, and 
launch raids. Moreover, genocidaires lurked behind legitimate refugees they had, in effect, 
turned into human shields. Referencing these concerns, the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
described, “the presence of refugees is a source of tensions between Tanzania and Burundi and to 
a certain extent Rwanda, arising from suspicion that the refugees are regrouping and training in 
warfare for attacking the countries of origin” (quoted in Rutwina, 297).  
Tanzania also had unique reasons to fear that hosting refugees might bring it into conflict 
with neighboring regional governments; it already had a history of being drawn into conflicts by 
refugees. The 1970s disputes between Tanzania and Uganda began after Ugandan refugees living 
in Tanzania attempted to oust Idi Amin by leading raids into Uganda. This soured relations 
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between the two countries, and eventually culminated in the Uganda-Tanzania War from 1978-
1979.  
Moreover, Tanzania had long feared that decades of refugee crises were manufactured by 
Rwanda and Burundi as a way to deal with overpopulation. They theorized that neighboring 
states sought to encourage large numbers of civilians to seek refuge in less populous neighboring 
states. A senior official in the Prime Minister’s office at the time described this sentiment: 
“These are funny people [referring to Rwandan and Burundian leaders]. How can a government 
be indifferent to a situation in which over three million of its people live in exile as 
refugees?...We think that from time to time they deem it necessary to generate turmoil and 
conflict and throw some people out to stabilize the ratio of population to land” (quoted in Adisa 
1995). However, this is a rather thin and implausible justification for genocide, suggesting that 
Tanzanian elites again attempted to “oversell” a security justification to the international 
community. 
Whereas Tanzanian elites voiced several external security concerns to justify the border 
closures, Tanzania’s behavior during the lead up and following the closures suggests that this 
was not their true motivation. Though Brahim notes that “[most] of the refugees came with arms 
and ammunition,” no attempt was made by the border guards or security patrols to disarm 
refugees (1995). This refusal to demilitarize the refugees occurred despite clear precedence 
within Tanzanian law to do so. Tanzania’s Refugee (Control) Act of 1965, still in force at the 
time, called for confiscating and impounding refugee weapons, cattle and vehicles. Even more 
damning, Tanzania actually encouraged Burundian rebel refugees to use Tanzanian bases to train 
and refinance. Human Rights Watch reported that “rebel soldiers continued to be trained in 
Tanzanian military bases in 1995 and 1996. Tanzania also permitted Burundian rebel leaders to 
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solicit support on Tanzanian soil from governments such as Sudan and Iran, which maintain 
embassies in Dar-es-Salaam” (Human Rights Watch 1999).  
In a move that further exacerbated security issues, Tanzanian planners purposefully 
placed refugee camps in Western Tanzania, thus keeping refugees near Tanzania’s shared 
borders with their countries of origin. Tanzanian decision makers could have located the refugees 
away from these shared borders, making refugee involvement in the conflict logistically 
impossible. They had done so in the past. Between 1960 and 1990, Tanzania used this strategy to 
spread refugees around the country, mitigating the security concerns created by the refugee 
camp. The fact that Tanzania chose the hosting strategy least able to contain rebel activity, 
trained rebels, and refused to disarm refugees demonstrates that Tanzania’s stated motivations 
and observed behavior did not align in this case.  
Another plausible explanation for Tanzania’s turn towards refoulment and border 
closures was the magnitude of the refugee crisis and the impact it had on host countries. During 
the 1994-1996 period, Benaco, Tanzania’s largest camp, swelled with 350,000 Rwandan and 
Burundian refugees, and was second in population size only to the capital, Dar-es-Salaam. This 
camp was only designed to hold 200,000, and quickly became overpopulated. Local papers 
reported on the squalor of the camps. The Daily Telegraph called it “Hell on Earth” (1995). The 
Dar-es-Salaam Daily News, Tanzania’s state paper, remarked upon the smell of human waste 
that permeated the entire region (1995).  
Concentrating the refugees in Western Tanzania also had destabilizing social effects. 
Refugees outnumbered local Tanzanians by at least 2-to-1 at the height of the crisis in this 
otherwise sleepy area of the country. Aid convoys economically shocked local markets, radically 
lowering domestic prices on goods supplied with refugee rations, while sharply spiking regional 
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prices for un-included goods like fresh vegetables (Wall Street Journal 1995). Moreover, 
Tanzania saw little business from the aid convoys. The Principal Secretary at the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, noting that Tanzanian manufactures of blankets, soap and bottled water had been 
bypassed in favor of Kenyan contractors, observed, “We Tanzanians are wondering what we are 
getting out of all this trouble” (quoted in ibid.).  
Multiple officials and local papers remarked on the environmental degradation caused by 
the influx. Commentators in the Dar-es-Salaam Daily News argued that “The refugees need 
poles to build their huts and fuel to cook and trees are being chopped down indiscriminately-the 
rate of tree cutting grows faster than a bushfire” (1995). The Daily Telegraph described, “it is as 
if a plague of locusts had crossed the land” (1995). The Minister of Home Affairs, Augustine 
Mrema, voiced his own concerns: “Very soon Kagera and Kigoma [Districts in Western 
Tanzania hosting the most refugees] risk becoming deserts” (quoted in Daily News 1995). 
Brahim, reporting on the crisis for the government to the international community, observed that 
“Areas beyond 6km from the camps have been cleared of most or all trees. The refugees walk 
more than 8km daily from camps to gather wood and grass…subject[ing] the land to erosion and 
general decline” (1995). Refugees damaged many of the local crops, including bananas, maize, 
and cassava during their resettlement. 
However, changes in Tanzania’s hosting practices during the crisis magnified rather than 
minimized these destabilizing and environmentally degrading effects, implying that they were 
not primary drivers of Tanzanian border closures. Before 1988, Tanzania eschewed camps. Since 
the 1960s, it had allowed refugees to self-settle and integrate into local communities, even 
granting citizenship rights to many long-term refugees. This meant that the destabilizing effects 
of refugee inflows were largely mitigated by avoiding the concentration of refugee populations. 
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Refugees were allowed to become productive and active members of the communities in which 
they settled, thus avoiding the stigmatizing effects of large refugee camps. However, this 
inclusive and diffuse policy made it more difficult for aid agencies to service refugee 
populations, forcing Tanzania to bear more expenses for refugee maintenance than those offered 
by the camp-model. 
 Aid agencies implicitly pushed for the shift because they wanted to bypass local 
governments in the administration of aid. Tanzania’s change in hosting practices thus represents 
attempts to burden share and bargain with the international community for more refugee aid, 
consistent with my model's empirical implications. One possibility is that Tanzania shifted its 
hosting policy to the less effective camp model, preferred by international aid agencies at the 
time, because of the scale of the crisis. However, Tanzania had already shifted towards refugee 
warehousing in 1988 while responding to much smaller flows (L’Ecluse 2010; Chaulia 2003). 
Thus, this questionable policy shift began before the massive influx of refugees during the Great 
Lake Crisis. A joint explanation may be probable: Tanzania likely used border closures and 
camps to bargain with the international community, in part due to the scale of the crisis. The 
magnitude of the Great Lakes Crisis may have encouraged Tanzania to adopt a more dramatic 
form of crisis bargaining when negotiating with donors.  
Tanzania actively linked the border closures to attempts to negotiate more aid from the 
international community. Kikwete explained the closure: “The mood of the Tanzanian people 
towards refugees has changed...Tanzania’s generosity should not be taken for granted” (quoted 
in Edward Mogire, Victims as Security Threat, (Ashgate Publishing, 2011)). The country’s Prime 
Minister, Cleopa Msuya, further pointed to the lack of sufficient regional coordination when 
accounting for the border closure to the UNHCR. Msuya stated, “Tanzania is ready to receive 
 108 
refugees but first our neighbors settle their own problems” (quoted in Inter Press Service, 1995). 
In the 1990s, Tanzania closed borders, threatened, and occasionally forcibly expelled refugees, 
but only during periods where the international community flagged in its support for aid 
(Whitaker, 2008). Beth Whitaker argues: 
Senior officials increased their pressure on donors, implicitly threatening to send 
the refugees home if funding cuts were not reversed. Local representatives 
pleaded with UNHCR and NGOs for more resources. By all accounts, though, the 
strongest reaction came from the district commissioner in Kibondo, who 
threatened to close a refugee camp, declared the local UNHCR head persona non 
grata, and demanded that WFP distribute full rations until the food ran out 
(refugees who received nothing would have to go home) (2008, 247). 
 
Once-secret CIA assessments further suggest that funding concerns determined Tanzania’s 
border policy: 
 “The Mwinyi government increasingly doubts the international community’s 
commitment to solving the regional refugee crisis...UNHCR officials are reducing 
their existing aid programs by about 30 percent. Dar es Salaam points to these 
developments as indications that the UN is gradually losing interest in easing 
Tanzania’s burden” (Africa Review 1995).  
 
UNHCR assessments also point towards their knowledge of Tanzania’s issue-linkage approach:  
Assessing the reasons behind Tanzania’s border closure... UNHCR’s Tanzania 
BO stressed ‘the lack of recognition by the international community of Tanzania’s 
sacrifices as reflected in the dearth of financial and other support from the donor 
countries’...In this sense the border closure can be seen as an attempt at leveraging 
the international community into action (Long, 2010).   
 
Clearly, the international donor community and Western elites were aware of Tanzania’s 
issue-linkage within its evolving refugee policy. In interviews with top Ministry of Home Affairs 
officials, Whitaker further found that without declining aid flows, Tanzania planned to adopt a 
more welcoming approach (2008, 253). 
In addition to validating the assumption that states link funding issues with border closure 
policy, the Tanzanian case highlights several of the model’s implications. First, border closures 
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and forced reparations severely threatened refugees, and international organizations responded to 
the increased risks border closures bore upon this vulnerable group. In several high-profile cases 
during this period, returned Tutsi were frequently killed while crossing the border into Rwanda. 
Returned or barricaded Hutu met a similar fate in Burundi. News reports from the time indicate 
that the border closure trapped 100,000 people attempting to flee Burundi in an area where the 
Tutsi-dominated Burundi army actively targeted refugees and waged a scorched earth policy to 
kill and drive them away (Inter Press Service 1995). Moreover, it is clear that Tanzania closed its 
borders specifically due to the refugee and contingent international funding crisis. Tanzania 
targeted the closures to specific refugee groups. Tanzania received significant criticism over its 
closed-door policy from the international community. Aid organizations and donors regularly 
highlighted the humanitarian implications during the Great Lakes crisis, suggesting that they 
indeed possessed benevolent intentions, if limited resources.  
Consistent with the model’s equilibrium, border closures effectively attracted additional 
aid flows. OECD aid statistics note a significant downward trend in real aid distribution 
throughout the early 1990s. This trend reverses in 1995-1996, closely aligning with Tanzania’s 
refugee border closures. Such a reversal is all the more stunning given that the international 
community saw itself to be in a post-crisis period at the time. During post-crisis periods, aid 
generally decreases as international attention moves on to newer emergencies. Many of the 
newly funded projects further reflected donors’ attempts to ameliorate the effects of the refugees 
on Tanzania. For example, in 1996, following the border closure, Denmark donated its largest 
share of aid to Tanzania. It funded such projects as the Kibondo Afforestation Project, which 
planted over 800,000 seedlings to regenerate forests damaged by the refugee influx (Malocho 
1998). Around the same time, the UNHCR also shifted policies, from refusing to work with local 
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NGOs, to launching several trial projects directly with local Tanzanian organizations (Whitaker 
2002, 57). Many of these trial projects eventually became long-term projects. This tactical 
adjustment in the UNHCR’s budget and strategy more directly benefitted Tanzanian 
organizations and businesses. It also represented a major shift in donor policy. During initial 
donor meetings held to address the crisis in 1994, the aid community soundly rejected this 
strategy of directly alleviating the effects of refugees on host nations. The ex post fears of 
benevolent donors thus allowed Tanzania to imperil the lives of fleeing people in exchange for 
more aid, and qualitatively improved aid from the Tanzanian perspective.  
Those escaping Burundi had two choices when selecting an asylum country. They could 
head east and seek shelter in Tanzania, or they could move west and hope for safety in Zaire, like 
so many others--over a million refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. This makes Zaire the logical 
second country to consider within a bargaining game over aid disbursement. Alternatively, one 
might also note extra-regional conflicts that garnered UNHCR and the aid community’s concern 
at the same time, such as the brewing Balkans crisis. Asylum countries hosting European 
refugees competed for shares of the same limited pool of aid and donor attention. Of course, the 
conditions within European asylum-granting countries at this time would definitionally be 
considered a good state of the world relative to African hosts. Tanzania and Zaire had some of 
the lowest GDP per capita and development indicators in the world. In order to continue 
analyzing the theory according to its most difficult tests, this analysis will conscribe itself to 
Tanzania and Zaire’s relative states during the lead up to the border closures.  
Zaire had long experienced one party rule, lead by Mobutu Seso Seko since the mid-
1960s. However, Mobutu was aging. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War, the international 
community pressured many countries, including Zaire and Tanzania, to offer multi-party 
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elections in a move towards democracy. While Tanzania’s ruling party remained relatively 
popular and stable during the lead up to multi-party elections, several factions successfully 
pressured the Mobutu regime to form a coalition government in 1990. However, Mobutu 
managed to maintain control of the most important institutions within the government. Seeing 
that the coalition government could not produce actual change, in 1993, Laurent Monsengwo and 
Etienne Tshisekedi formed a second anti-Mobutu government in Zaire (Dunn 2003). Ethnic 
Tutsis, living in Eastern Burundi, largely supported the anti-Mobutu cause. The Mobutu regime 
had significantly curtailed Tutsi citizenship and political rights since the 1980s (Vlassenroot 
2002; Bayart 1998).  
From the Mobutu regime’s perspective, streams of fleeing Hutu’s represented an 
opportunity to gain the upper hand against domestic opposition (Mamdani 2002; Neimann 2007; 
Tull 2005). While closing the border might have helped Zaire receive more aid, Mobutu would 
have lost many natural allies in his fight against restive Tutsis. The war shock itself helped 
determine the relative state of the world for each country. From Mobutu's perspective, Hutu 
allies who were more than happy to put down Tutsi opposition improved his government’s 
position. Though Zaire and Tanzania were comparatively poor, Zaire’s ruling government was in 
a better state to accommodate large Hutu refugee groups during the phases of the crisis when 
Tanzania considered, and eventually adopted, its border closure policy.  
Case Study 2: Macedonia/Kosovo Border Closure  
 
While there had been long-standing tensions between ethnic Albanians and the more 
politically dominant Serbians in Kosovo, a perfect storm of conditions fomented a genocidal 
civil war in 1998. Huge stockpiles of weaponry flowed into Kosovo after Albania’s government 
collapsed in 1997. Albania’s looted military hardware helped grow the Kosovo Liberation 
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Army’s (KLA) stockpiles. This provided necessary materials for the KLA to violently challenge 
Serbian control over the region. Moreover, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia teetered towards 
its own constitutional crisis in 1997. Protests erupted in Serbia after Slobodan Milosevic’s 
political party attempted to engineer fraudulent election results. In a successful bid to consolidate 
his power and circumvent term limits, Milosevic changed his title from President of Serbia to 
President of the Yugoslav Federation. Milosevic, who had long been an ardent Serbian 
nationalist, bolstered his power by agitating ethnic divides within his country. A series of tit-for-
tat operations, largely won by the KLA, transformed the Albanian insurgency into a full scale 
war in 1998. It quickly bloomed into a major international crisis with U.S.-led NATO launching 
an air offensive to dampen and keep the conflict from spilling over into neighboring countries.  
Prior to the Syrian conflict, The United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) claims the Kosovo conflict produced the largest annual exodus of a refugee group in a 
single year (2012). The conflict generated over 850,000 refugees who fled their homes to avoid 
NATO bombs and Serbian reprisals in 1999 (Waller et al. 2001, iv; Daalder and O’Hanlon 
2001). This represented over 90% of the Kosovar Albanian population according to the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2003). The vast majority of these people 
sought safety in neighboring countries, such as Macedonia and Albania, before either returning 
to their homes or finding permanent settlement across Europe and North America.  
Macedonia closed its border with Kosovo multiple times during the conflict. The first 
closure came right as the U.S. and NATO escalated the conflict to hitherto unseen levels. 
Macedonia sealed the border on 23 February 1999. NATO began its aerial bombardment 
campaign the very next day. The border closure trapped thousands of Kosovar Albanians trying 
to flee violence with their persecutors and violated International Law against non-refoulement. 
 113 
To resolve the initial border closure, the international community, led by NATO, agreed to help 
ease the burden of hosting. Donors granted more aid, and established the Humanitarian 
Evacuation Programme in order to facilitate the management of refugee caseloads to countries 
within and outside the region (Eggli 2002). Macedonia later employed closures when transfers 
flagged relative to new refugee inflows to ensure the international community would continue to 
follow through on its agreements (Williams and Zeager 2004).  
Macedonian policy and its attempts to negotiate with the international community 
violated refugee case management norms enshrined in international law. Macedonia refused to 
open the border unless the refugee caseload was spread throughout the region. This violated the 
principle of First Country of Asylum, designed to allow refugees to self-determine their safest 
exit point from a conflict, and to prevent host countries from denying refugees aid (Hammerstad 
2014).2 Macedonia further violated refugee self-determination norms when it bused and airlifted 
refugees that had successfully crossed into Macedonia to other host countries, often without the 
refugees’ full consent (Greenhill 2010). UNHCR accounts from the time indicate that 
Macedonian police even coerced and beat refugees to get their acquiescence for these transfers 
(1999; Suhrke, et al. 2000). These normative violations had significant humanitarian implications 
in addition to representing an example of international crisis bargaining.  
The most prominent example of using refugees as hostages occurred at the Blace border 
crossing. Macedonia closed its Blace entry point in early April, trapping 65,000 refugees within 
the border area between Macedonia and Kosovo. The Associated Press colloquially named this 
muddy valley “no man’s land” due to the harsh conditions the refugees faced (1999). The area 
provided no shelter, no food or water outside what the refugees had carried themselves, a 
                                                 
2 During the Holocaust, countries notoriously passed the buck when it came to granting asylum to 
beleaguered refugees.  
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complete lack of hygiene facilities, and very restricted medical care. Macedonia discouraged aid 
groups from crossing into the region. Even after Macedonia reopened its border, it only allowed 
a trickle of people to cross. Thus, tens of thousands of escaping civilians spent several days 
trapped under unremittingly dangerous conditions while Macedonia bargained with the 
international community for more refugee funding (L.A. Times 1999). 
A final example demonstrating Macedonia’s linking of border closures to negotiations 
over aid occurred on 6 May 1999. A UNHCR report describes the harrowing scene and 
foreshadows concerns over ethnic cleansing:  
UNHCR staff saw about 1,000 refugees forcibly returned to the Yugoslav side 
of the border Wednesday evening, pushed back first by Macedonian authorities, 
then by the Serb side. Once they were back in Yugoslav territory, Serbian troops 
could be seen beating and shoving the refugees until they were out of sight 
(1999).  
 
Macedonia sought increased funding, but also international aid in relocating refugees to other 
host countries. During the second day of the closure, Macedonia’s Defense Minister Nikola 
Kljusev stated, “There can be a balance established between a number who are evacuated and the 
number of refugees who are allowed into our country” (quoted in Reuters 1999). Macedonia thus 
directly linked the May border closure to demands that NATO and the international community 
make good on earlier negotiations regarding refugee case management.  
Donors fully recognized that Macedonia used refugees as hostages in their negotiations. 
The New York Times reported that “Aid workers called the border closing and the Defense 
Minister's comment the latest examples of the Macedonian Government's using the lives of 
Kosovar refugees to effectively blackmail aid agencies and Western governments” (1999). 
Amnesty International argued that Macedonia was “playing politics” with the lives of vulnerable 
people (1999). Their report argued: 
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Frequent closures of the border by the Macedonian authorities seem to be used 
to prompt quicker action in evacuating refugees.  It is difficult to measure 
whether states and international agencies are moving as quickly as possible to 
evacuate refugees. However, it is clear that the actions of the Macedonian 
government in effectively holding to ransom those waiting on the borders to 
enter Macedonia violates agreed international standards...In response to pleas for 
the international community to share responsibility for assisting and protecting 
those refugees in the region, many countries have provided not only substantial 
sums of financial aid, but to date, some 39 countries have agreed to evacuate 
refugees from Macedonia (Amnesty International 1999, 15-16, emphasis added). 
 
Moreover, border closures served as a winning strategy. Macedonia not only managed to 
extract more financial aid from the international community, but it also achieved important 
political concessions limiting its responsibilities to admitted refugees. Donor countries and 
international agencies promised Macedonia an additional $250 million dollars in aid and 
suggested more would come to convince Macedonia to reopen the border during the Blace crisis 
(N.Y. Times 1999).   On the same day that Macedonia agreed to open its border in May, the 
World Bank approved a 50 million dollar credit line to the country (Greenhill 2010). During the 
April closure, NATO built refugee camps at Brazda, Stenkovec, and  Neprosteno within a single 
day. Macadonia reopened the border the day the three camps opened. Macedonia also got the 
international community to agree to transfer refugees to third countries, creating the HEP. As has 
been noted above, the HEP represented a significant departure from prior international norms on 
refugee management. With its hostage strategy, Macedonia extracted a highly unusual and 
important concession from NATO and donors.  
The pessimistic predictions of the model are well illustrated by both Macedonia’s and 
donor states’ behavior. The first empirical implication drawn out by the model is that a host 
country will use border closures early in a conflict. Macedonia shut its doors before NATO 
bombing even began, and successfully extracted more funding from them as a result. The second 
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empirical implication supported by the case is that border closures severely threaten escaping 
populations. Macedonian border closures significantly hurt the welfare of large numbers of 
refugees. Refugees suffered beatings, prolonged unlivable conditions, and even disappearances 
when refused entry to Macedonia. Macedonia even literally held 65,000 refugees as hostages 
between it and Kosovo’s border, and barely allowed the international community to monitor or 
render them assistance. Next, Macedonia linked its closures to aid and policy changes it sought 
from the international donor community. It was willing to imperil refugees to force greater 
concessions from donors. The model’s real world applicability would be nullified if Macedonia’s 
closures had derived from non-refugee considerations, but that is clearly not the case. The fourth 
empirical implication is that donors are motivated principally by the desire to ease refugee 
suffering. Donors cited humanitarian concerns several times when paying Macedonia’s  de facto 
ransom demands. Last, border closure should be an effective strategy in equilibrium to garner 
more international support. Each time Macedonia closed its borders, the ex post concerns of 
donors resulted in Macedonia successfully extracting additional resources from the U.S., the UN, 
NATO, and wealthy European countries.   
A careful reader will note that I have only discussed one host country so far. But the 
game’s findings in part derive from the non-cooperative interaction with a second host country. 
Albania, which also bordered Kosovo, and shared a strong ethnic kinship with the fleeing 
refugees, is the logical second host country to consider. The model predicts that the host country 
with the worse conditions will be the country most able to use refugees as hostages to bolster its 
bargaining power. Based purely on financial capacity, Albania should have been the country to 
close its borders. Albania was substantially poorer than Macedonia. Albania had spent decades 
isolated from the world under one of the least transparent communist regimes, crippling its 
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economy relative to more open Macedonia. Its economy had also been racked in 1997 by the 
collapse of dozens of Ponzi schemes which collectively duped over 70% of Albanians into 
investing. A naive analysis would thus claim that Albania faced a bad state of the world, while 
Macedonia enjoyed a good state of the world. 
Such a simplistic analysis fails to account for the financial and political ramifications of 
war shock itself. Serbian forces targeted ethnic Albanians during the Kosovo conflict. Refugees 
were nearly universally Albanian. Albania was much more prepared to absorb a huge influx of 
fleeing co-ethnics. Macedonia, on the other hand, had a delicate ethnic balance of majority 
Macedonians and minority ethnic Albanians prior to the war. Like other Balkan countries, 
Macedonian politics featured a dominant ethnic group capturing most institutions and political 
positions. Though, ethnic Macedonians did begrudgingly share some limited power with the 
minority community in a tenuous coalition government. Moreover, native Albanians within 
Macedonia were highly concentrated in the north of the country. Through the ‘90s, Macedonian 
Albanians organized several times for regional autonomy and increased protection of minority 
rights. The Macedonian majority feared that a large influx of Albanian refugees would prompt a 
secession attempt. Alternatively, they might bolster the Greater Albania movement, which 
desired to unify all land currently or historically occupied by Albanians into a single state. 
Polling suggests that a large majority of Albanians in Macedonia (53%), Albania(63%), and 
Kosovo(81%) support the concept of a Greater Albania (Gallup 2010). Some even feared that the 
war in Kosovo was a direct attempt by Milosevic to destabilize Macedonia into conflict. 
Abdurauf Pruthi, a former Macedonian politician and political commentator, describes this view: 
“We are concerned with preserving the stability of the country...We think Milosevic sent the 
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refugees as a 'special war' against Macedonia. It's obviously an effort to provoke instability here" 
(quoted in L.A. Times 1999).  
The war also had a special economic impact on Macedonia. Prior to the war, 2/3rds of 
Macedonia’s trade flowed through Yugoslavia.. Even before the large refugee flows developed, 
the war had collapsed industry across Macedonia. Macedonia’s Interior Minister, Pavle Trajnov, 
described the conditions at the time, “I think in six months there will be a total collapse of the 
economy. Then there would be a lot of side-effects for national security, law and order and 
society” (quoted in Independent 1999). He also noted that international banks were reluctant to 
give credit to Macedonians and that foreign companies had backed out of investment deals. 
 Therefore, the ethnic dimensions of the Kosovo war and Macedonia’s unique economic 
exposure meant that Macedonia experienced a bad state of the world, while Albania could better 
afford to house other Albanians. 
A final possible critique of the model is that Albania was not actually a strategic actor 
during the crisis. Williams and Zeager argue that any formal model of the Kosovo crisis should 
exclude Albania (2004). They argue that Albanian policy was fully sincere and expressive rather 
than strategic in nature. Their criticism ignores the ways in which world state enables or 
enervates bargaining leverage. My model provides a sound theoretic explanation for Albania’s 
relative quiescence. Considering the highly strategic nature of international politics, researchers 
should default towards treating all relevant actors as strategic unless compelling evidence 
suggests otherwise. Moreover, arguing that Albania was not a strategic actor does not reflect 
historical facts. In an attempt to fully shirk responsibility for refugees, Macedonia argued that all 
Kosovo refugees should be sent to Albania due to their shared ethnic kinship. President Gligorov 
suggested that Albania was the only “natural homeland” for Kosovar Albanians (Gorsevski 
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2012). Macedonia even tried to convince the international community to allow the formation of a 
transit corridor between Kosovo and Albania through Macedonia, that upon entering refugees 
would not be considered as first arrivals into Macedonia (International Crisis Group 1998). 
Albania reacted swiftly and mobilized a diplomatic response that ensured Macedonia could not 
fully displace the duty of refugee care on to Albania. UNHCR archives note that the Albanian 
government was “profoundly irritated” by Gligorov’s comments, sparking a multinational 
diplomatic crisis (Long 2010). Criticizing the Macedonian president’s remarks, Albania’s 
President Meidani stated, "Albanians, wherever they have been living or are living inside or 
outside the territory of Albania, they all are in their ethnic territories and every effort to identify 
the territory of Albania as the only homeland of all Albanians in the region are approaches which 
not only carry a chauvinistic spirit but they also do not serve the climate of regional cooperation 
or good neighbourliness” (Albanian Telegraphic Agency 1999).  
It took shuttle diplomacy by the United States, NATO and the UNHCR to sooth Albanian 
concerns and moderate Macedonian demands. If Williams and Zeager’s hypothesis were correct, 
and Albania did not act strategically when supporting its coethnics and managing the refugee 
crisis, this interaction would not have required so much diplomatic maneuvering to alleviate.  
Conclusion: 
 
This paper has argued that border closures are sometimes an effective strategy in 
garnering additional aid for refugee-hosting countries. Countries that threaten the lives of 
incoming refugees and link these threats to demands for more aid regularly receive more 
funding. The paper has highlighted a Samaritan’s Dilemma model that explains this regularity, 
and found substantial evidence of refugee-motivated border closures in Macedonia and Tanzania.  
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Though these cases come from the late 90s, contemporary events continue to bear 
hallmarks of the Refugee-Hostage Dilemma. With states like Macedonia and Austria presently 
refusing to allow refugees to pass through their territory towards more welcoming states without 
increased support, the dilemma continues to influence international refugee flows and policy. 
Moreover, Tanzania and Macedonia are not unique in using refugees as hostages during aid 
negotiations. Zaire, Pakistan, and South Africa among many others have used border closures 
and turn-back policies when discussing aid allocations with the donor community. 
What can the aid community do about the existence of the Refugee-Hostage Dilemma? 
One of the paradoxes identified in the model is that receiving countries are able to leverage 
humanitarian sentiment for a bolstered negotiating position. Ironically, the donor’s desire to help 
refugees is the very characteristic which winds up further endangering them. Because donor ex 
ante and ex post incentives are incompatible, the standard recommendation is to delegate aid 
disbursement control to an entity or organization without similarly exploitable preferences. To 
that end, more hardnosed international financial institutions may better address the needs of 
refugees without imperiling them. For example, the IMF emphasizes stability rather than 
development or humanitarian preferences. It may therefore serve as a less manipulable aid 
distribution organization.  
Within extant humanitarian organizations, personnel hiring policies placing legal 
constraints against the reallocation of funds could make initial aid allocations more credible. This 
strategy has been successfully used within the private sector. Agents with fiduciary 
responsibilities regularly help manage and control corporate budgets to ensure that company 
decisions align with investor needs.  
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A third possible strategy is for donors to determine a fixed amount of aid allocation per 
refugee, regardless of receiving country. This would reduce the competition to the lowest 
common denominator that produces border closures. This final strategy has the advantage of 
further providing stability to the international refugee system, which has been notably lacking 
since its inception. Per capita refugee funding would further discourage treating refugees from 
different regions unevenly.  
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APPENDIX   1.1 
BORDERING AUTOCRATS: INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL CONTROLS 
 
Studies of territoriality and autocratic militarization behavior frequently include a more 
diverse array of control variables than I have included within my model. Not all of the common 
controls are appropriate when attempting to determine a causal effect. Nonetheless, my results 
remain robust to adding many additional controls. Table 2 highlights the sensitivity of my 
finding to the inclusion of other variables. The entries in each row record the estimated 
coefficient on the military regime territoriality interaction term. All coefficients are based on 
adding the indicated variable to my model which includes controls for capabilities and power 
status. Across all alternative specifications, military regime territoriality retains its statistical 
significance. Moreover, the direction of the effect of military regime territoriality remains 
consistent across specifications.  
Ally- Mutual alliances are thought to influence the onset and escalation of conflict (Huth 
and Allee 2002). Moreover, country’s sharing an alliance with democracies are more likely to 
democratize as a result of these agreements (Gibler and Wolford 2006). This suggests that 
alliances may also impact a country’s regime type. My s_ld_1 and s_ld_2 variables include a 
measure of alliance, but to test whether alternative specifications impact my results in substitute 
an alternative measure. However, my results are unaffected by this alternative specification. I 
created a dummy variable based on the COW inter-state alliance dataset for if a dyad shares an 
alliance to test this. This dummy variable is coded 1 if a dyad has any of the following: a defense 
pact, a nonaggression pact, a neutrality agreement, or an entente. 
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     Foreign policy preferences- Since S is not the only measure of foreign policy preferences, 
I replaced my s_ld_1 and s_ld_2 measures with Tau-glob within my model (Bueno de Mesquita 
1981). Tau-glob is a measure of alliance portfolio similarity within a dyad which ranges from -1 
(indicating no common ties) to +1(shares the same set of alliances). I employed EUGene to 
create this data (Bennett and Stam 2000). Again, military regime territoriality remains 
significantly related to conflict onset regardless of measure of foreign policy similarity.  
     Distance between country 1 and country 2- Some models of territoriality include both 
contiguity and a measure of distance between the countries in a dyad. Because distance affects a 
country’s ability to project power, states further apart should be less likely to engage in a 
conflict. Using Stinnett et al.’s measure of logged distance I find that my results are unaffected 
by this inclusion (2002). 
     Economic Openness-  Economic openness may affect leader’s foreign policy options and 
may limit their ability to employ force. Moreover, more economically open countries frequently 
share foreign policy preferences, diminishing the likelihood of conflict (Gartzke 2007). 
However, economic openness is also a result of a country’s regime type. Several forms of 
autocracy view market liberalization as diminishing their control over power and enact attempts 
to block it. Nevertheless, my findings remain unaffected by adding it to my model. Following 
Lee and Mitchell’s example, I measure economic openness as a country’s total exports plus its 
total imports divided by its GDP (2012). Gleditsch’s data on trade and gdp are used to form this 
variable (2002).  
     Other MID involvement- Huth and Allee argue that states will examine each other’s 
behavior in other dyads to lessen their uncertainty over estimates of military strength and resolve 
(2002). Several scholars have found that MID involvement is an outgrowth of a country’s 
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domestic political structure and I therefore do not include it within my main model. Controlling 
for it does not impact my findings. I create two variables, one for each state within a dyad, that 
counts the number of other MIDs they are involved in within that year.  
     New Autocratic Regime- New regimes are especially conflict prone (Colgan 2010; 
Mansfield and Snyder 2002). Military regimes are especially short lived. It may thus be possible 
that military regimes spuriously appear to be more territorial. To control for this I create a 
measure of whether country 1 is a new autocracy. Countries with an autocratic regime 3 years or 
younger receive a 1 on this dummy variable. Otherwise, countries are coded with a 0. Even 
accounting for the effects of youthful belligerency, military regime territoriality remains highly 
significant.   
     Within my main analysis, I employ non-military/non-personalist/non-single party 
regimes as the comparison base category. To ensure that my findings for military regimes are not 
dependent on the reference category, I vary the reference group. Military regime’s territorially 
remains positively and significantly related to conflict onset when the base regime includes only 
non-military/non-personalist autocracies (i.e. when I control for initiator democracy). Setting 
personalism as the base category also does not undermine my findings on military regimes 
conflict proneness during territorial disputes. Likewise, the impact of military regime 
territoriality on conflict emerges remains significant both when single party regimes as well as 
democracies are individually treated as the residual category.  
King and Zeng note that standard logistic regression can underestimate probabilities in 
rare events data (2001). I employ their -relogit- package to account for the fact that far more non-
events than events occur within MID data. Military regime territoriality remains robust to this 
correction.  
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     The autocratic regime literature has yet to universally adopt a single categorization of 
regime type. I employ Geddes original regime typology since it has been the most widely 
adopted within published work to date. However, if a typology categorizes differences in 
personalism and military leadership I am agnostic about employing it, provided it accounts for 
systematic differences in institutionalization of political transition across regimes. My theory 
focuses on the fears of irregular removal from office certain leaders face. Weeks (2012) coding 
of Lai and Slater (2006) typology best matches this theoretical argument since Lai and Slater’s 
original operationalization focuses exclusively on formal executive constraints. Therefore, I 
repeat my analysis using Weeks typology which codes regimes as juntas if they are non-
personalist military governments, strongmen if a regime consists of a military backed personalist, 
and bosses are personalist civilian regimes. As above, I interact these dummy regime codes with 
the territorial dispute variable to produce three territoriality regime interaction terms. I then 
replicate my full model using this alternative coding. Table 3 presents the results. Consistent 
with my findings, juntas are the most territorial regime. Both civilian and military backed 
personalists involved in a territorial dispute are not significantly associated with the emergence 
of conflict. Moreover, junta territoriality is significantly different from both strongman 
territoriality and boss territoriality at the p=.05 level when using a two-tailed test.   
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Table 2: Autocratic Territoriality and the Initiation of a Militarized Dispute:  
Alternative Specifications 
 
Predictor 
Coefficient on Military Regime X 
Territoriality 
Alternative Specifications for Foreign Policy 
Similarity 
 
Ally- Gibler &Sarkees coding .747<.001 
 (.180) 
Foreign policy preferences – Bueno de Mesquita 
coding 
.635.001 
 (.184) 
Alternative Specifications for Opportunity to Use 
Force 
 
Logged Distance between 2 capitals- Stinnett et. al 
coding 
.630.001 
 (.187) 
Possible Post-Treatment Controls  
Economic openness- Gleditsch coding 
[exp+imp/gdp] 
0.756<.001 
 (.189) 
Country 1 and 2 involved in other MIDs .427.029 
 (.196) 
New Autocratic Regime – based on Geddes coding .877<.001 
 (.184) 
Different Base Regime Categorizations  
Controlling for democracy: other autocracy base 
regime  - Geddes coding  
 
.809<.001 
 (.185) 
Compared to personalist base regime – Geddes 
coding 
0.772<.001 
 (.176) 
Compared to single party base regime – Geddes 
coding 
.933<..001 
 (.172) 
Compared to democracy base regime category – 
Geddes coding 
.809<.001 
 (.185) 
Compared to democracy –Polity IV .786<.001 
 (.189) 
Rare events logit  .673<.001 
 (.185) 
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Table 3: Alternative Regime Typologies and Conflict Onset 
 
Predictor 
Geddes 
Coding 
(DV: 
Initiation) 
1945-2007 
Weeks 2012 
Coding 
(DV: Initiation) 
1945-1999 
Geddes Coding 
(DV: 
Force/War) 
1945-2007 
Weeks 2012 Coding 
(DV: Force/War) 
1945-1999 
Military Regime 
Territoriality  
.675<.001  .332.026  
(.185)  (.149)  
Personalist Regime 
Territoriality  
.029.864  .044.739  
(.167)  (.132)  
Single Party 
Territoriality 
 
Military Regime 
-.407.002 
(.130) 
.488<.001 
 -.206.037 
(.099) 
.621<.001 
 
 (.114)  (.071)  
Personalist Regime .657<.001  .432<.001  
 
Single Party Regime 
 
(.088) 
.502<.001 
(.073) 
 (.058) 
.436<.001 
(.044) 
 
Junta Territoriality  .664.006  .32.105 
  (.240)  (.197) 
Strongman Territoriality  .26.114  .067.618 
  (.164)  (.134) 
Boss Territoriality  -.239.119  -.469>.001 
  (.153)  (.112) 
Junta  .394.002  .566<.001 
  (.126)  (.075) 
Strongman  .534<.001  .34<.001 
  (.097)  (.069) 
Boss  .472<.001  .780<.001 
  (.095)  (.052) 
Territorial Dispute 1.99<.001 1.78<.001 1.64<.001 1.66<.001 
 (.103) (.087) (.072) (.062) 
Contiguity -.627<.001 -.656<.001 -.517<.001 -.536<.001 
 (.013) (.013) (.008) (.008) 
Claims Years .016<.001 .015<.001 .015<.001 .016<.001 
 (.000) (.001) (.000) (.001) 
Minor x Minor Power 
Dyad 
-1.33<.001 -1.36<.001 -1.68<.001 -1.57<.001 
(.067) (.068) (.046) (.047) 
Ln(High/Low 
Capabilities Ratio) 
-.147<.001 -.139<.001 -.227<.001 -.212<.001 
(.018) (.018) (.012) (.012) 
A’s Similarity to 
System Leader 
-.161..238 -.208.121 -.276.001 -.401<.001 
(.137) (.134) (.087) (.083) 
B’s Similarity to 
System Leader 
-.327.012 -.273.039 -.389<.001 -.431<.001 
(.13) (.133) (.082) (.083) 
Years without a MID (t) -.151<.001 -.150<.001 -.292<.001 -.28<.001 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
t2 .002<.001 .002<.001 .005<.001 .005<.001 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
t3 -.000<.001 -.000<.001 -.000<.001 -.000<.001 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
 135 
Constant -1.16<.001 -.859<.001 .623<.001 .644<.001 
 (.124) (.113) (.081) (.077) 
Pseudo R2 .3593 .3680 .4082 .4086 
Log likelihood -8820.20 -8243.05 -18065.44 -17310.637 
N 1080610 1041001 1080610 1041001 
Notes: two-tailed p-values in italicized super-scripts, standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 2: Autocratic Territoriality and the Initiation of a Militarized Dispute:  
Alternative Specifications 
 
To rule out the possibility that particularly belligerent military regimes drive my result, I 
drop 3 of the most bellicose military regimes with active territorial disputes. My results are 
robust to both individually dropping these countries and dropping them as a group.  
Table 4: Autocratic Territoriality and the Initiation of a Militarized Dispute:  
Dropping Outlier Military Initiators  
 
Country 
Coefficient on Military Regime 
X Territoriality 
Argentina (drops 9133 observations) .753<0.001 
Guatemala (drops 9068 observations)  .682<.001 
South Korea (drops 8736 observations) .6300.001 
All Three (drops 26937 observations) .624.002 
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APPENDIX 1.2 
 BORDERING AUTOCRATS: ENDOGENEITY ANALYSIS   
 
If different regime types make more claims than others, it is possible an endogenous 
relationship exists between regime type and the militarization of a territorial dispute. To examine 
the possibility that regime might impact a state’s willingness to make a territorial claim, I 
examined the correlation between regime type and territorial claims initiation. Table 4 presents 
these correlations. A correlation coefficient can range from 1 to -1, with 1 indicating a perfectly 
positive relationship between two variables and -1 indicating a perfectly inverse relationship 
between two variables. Territorial dispute initiation is uncorrelated with autocratic regime type. 
This suggests that endogeneity is not a problem with these data.   
 
Table 4: Correlation Between Regime Type and Territorial Dispute Initiation 
  
Military 
Regime 
Single Party 
Regime 
 
Personalist 
Regime 
Territorial Dispute 
Initiation 
Military 1.0000    
Single Party  -0.1424 1.0000   
Personalist -0.0955 -0.2070 1.0000  
Territorial Dispute 
Initiation 
-0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0017 1.0000 
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APPENDIX 2.1 
UNSTABLE GROUND: DATA 
This appendix highlights all original data collected for paper 2. It lists border closing 
countries, their targets, and the year dates for the closures. 
 
Table 1: Directed Dyadic Border Closures, 1980-2011 
Closing Country Target Country Start/End 
Date 
Closing Country Target 
Country 
S/E Date 
Albania Greece 1949-1991 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Congo 2001 
North Korea South Korea 1953-2004 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Rwanda 2001 
Bhutan China 1961-
Present 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Uganda 2001 
USSR US 1961-1989 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Sudan 2001 
USSR Finland 1961-1989 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Zambia 2001 
USSR Sweden 1961-1989 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Central African 
Republic 
2001 
USSR Turkey 1961-1989 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Tanzania 2001 
East Germany West Germany 1961-1989 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Burundi 2001 
East Germany Denmark 1961-1989 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Angola 2001 
Czechoslovakia West Germany 1961-1989 Thailand Burma 2001 
Czechoslovakia Austria 1961-1989 Macedonia Yugoslavia 2001 
Hungary Austria 1961-1989 Liberia Sierra Leone 2001 
Yugoslavia Austria 1961-1989 Tajikistan Uzbekistan 2001 
Yugoslavia Italy 1961-1989 Pakistan Afghanistan 2001 
Bulgaria Greece 1961-1989 Iran Afghanistan 2001-2002 
Bulgaria Turkey 1961-1989 Israel Jordan 2001 
China India 1962-2006 Israel Egypt 2001 
United States Cuba 1963-2011 
on 
United States Canada 2001 
Algeria Morocco 1976-1988 United States Mexico 2001 
Spain Gibraltar/UK 1977-1985 China Pakistan 2001 
Tanzania Kenya 1977-1983 India Pakistan 2001-2003 
Egypt Libya 1977-1989 Pakistan India 2001-2003 
China Vietnam 1980-1983 Somalia Djibouti 2002 
Iraq Syria 1980-1997 Somalia Kenya 2002 
Syria Iraq 1980-1997 Somalia Ethiopia 2002 
Thailand Laos 1980 Burma Thailand 2002 
Paraguay Argentina 1980 Thailand Burma 2002 
Paraguay Bolivia 1980 Thailand Cambodia 2003 
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Paraguay Brazil 1980 Cambodia Thailand 2003 
Zambia Zimbabwe  1980 Turkey Iraq 2003 
Thailand Laos 1981 Jordan Iraq 2003 
Argentina Chile 1981 Syria Iraq 2003 
Israel Jordan 1981 Lebanon Israel 2003 
Jordan  Israel 1981 Iran Iraq 2003 
Kenya Tanzania 1982 Sudan Eritrea 2002-2003 
Kenya Somalia 1982 Kyrgyzstan China 2003 
Kenya Uganda 1982 Spain Gibraltar 2003 
Kenya Ethiopia 1982 Russia China 2003 
Kenya Sudan 1982 Dominican 
Republic 
Haiti 2004 
Turkey Soviet Union 1982 Macedonia Yugoslavia 2004 
Israel Lebanon (UN 
Peace) 
1982 Peru Bolivia 2004 
Ivory Coast Ghana 1982 Israel Egypt 2004 
Ivory Coast Guinea 1982 Russia Georgia 2004 
Ivory Coast Mali 1982 Iraq Iran 2004 
Ivory Coast Burkina Faso 1982 Iraq Kuwait 2004 
Ivory Coast Liberia 1982 Iraq Saudi Arabia 2004 
Ghana Ivory Coast 1982     Iraq Jordan 2004 
Ghana Togo 1982 Iraq Turkey 2004 
Ghana Burkina Faso 1982 Iraq Syria 2004 
Ghana Benin 1983 Syria Iraq 2004 
Ghana Nigeria 1983 Iraq Iran 2005 
Ghana Ivory Coast 1983 Iraq Kuwait 2005 
Ghana Togo 1983 Iraq Saudi Arabia 2005 
Ghana Burkina Faso 1983 Iraq Jordan 2005 
Tanzania Kenya 1983 Iraq Turkey 2005 
Tanzania Uganda 1983 Iraq Syria 2005 
Tanzania Zambia 1983 Togo Ghana 2005 
Tanzania Mozambique 1983 Togo Benin 2005 
Tanzania Burundi 1983 Togo Burkina Faso 2005 
Tanzania Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
1983 Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan 2005 
Tanzania Rwanda 1983 Syria Iraq 2005 
Tanzania Malawi 1983 Laos Thailand 2005 
Nigeria Chad 1983 Israel  Egypt 2005 
Israel Lebanon 1983 Egypt Israel 2005 
France Spain 1984 Jordan Syria 2005 
Lebanon Syria 1984 Jordan Iraq 2005 
Guinea Mali 1984 Jordan Israel 2005 
Guinea Liberia 1984 Jordan Saudi Arabia 2005 
Guinea Sierra Leone 1984 Afghanistan Pakistan 2005 
Guinea Ivory Coast 1984 Israel Egypt 2005 
Guinea Senegal 1984 Iraq Iran 2006 
Guinea Guinea-Bissau 1984 Rwanda Uganda 2006 
Nigeria Niger 1984 Egypt Israel 2006 
Nigeria Chad 1984 Neighbors Lebanon 2006 
Nigeria Cameroon 1984 Russia Georgia 2006-2010 
Nigeria Benin 1984 Burundi DRCongo 2006 
Israel Lebanon 1985 Israel Egypt 2006 
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Uganda Rwanda 1985 Thailand Burma 2006 
Uganda Kenya 1985 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Congo 2006 
Uganda Tanzania 1985 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Rwanda 2006 
Uganda Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
1985 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Uganda 2006 
Uganda Sudan 1985 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Sudan 2006 
Liberia Sierra Lone 1985 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Zambia 2006 
Liberia Guinea 1985 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Central African 
Republic 
2006 
Liberia Ivory Coast 1985 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Tanzania 2006 
Egypt Libya 1985 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Burundi 2006 
Tunisia Libya 1985-1986 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Angola 2006 
Nigeria Niger 1986 Israel Jordan 2006 
Nigeria Chad 1986 Israel Syria 2006 
Nigeria Cameroon 1986 Israel Egypt 2006 
Nigeria Benin 1986 Israel Lebanon 2006 
Libya Tunisia 1986 Turkmenistan Afghanistan 2006 
Libya Algeria 1986 Turkmenistan Iran 2006 
Libya Sudan 1986 Turkmenistan Kazakhstan 2006 
Libya Chad 1986 Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 2006 
Libya Niger 1986 Kenya Somalia 2006-2007 
South Africa Lesotho 1986 Burma China 2006-2007 
Dominican 
Republic 
Haiti 1986 Ivory Coast Ghana 2007 
Uganda Sudan 1986 Guinea Guinea Bissau 2007 
Zambia Zimbabwe 1986 Iraq Iran 2007 
Zambia Tanzania 1986 Iraq Kuwait 2007 
Zambia Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
1986 Iraq Saudi Arabia 2007 
Zambia Botswana 1986 Iraq Jordan 2007 
Zambia Namibia 1986 Iraq Turkey 2007 
Zambia Malawi 1986 Iraq Syria 2007 
Zambia Angola 1986 Indonesia East Timor 2007 
Burundi Rwanda 1987 East Timor Indonesia 2007 
Burundi Tanzania 1987 Iran Pakistan 2007-2008 
Burundi Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
1987 Nigeria Niger 2007 
China Nepal 1987 Nigeria Chad 2007 
Burkina Faso Mali 1987 Nigeria Benin 2007 
Burkina Faso Ivory Coast 1987 Nigeria Cameroon 2007 
Burkina Faso Benin 1987 India Nepal 2007 
Burkina Faso Togo 1987 Pakistan Afghanistan 2007 
Burkina Faso Ghana 1987 Israel Egypt 2007 
Burkina Faso Niger 1987 Iran Iraq 2007-2008? 
Thailand Laos 1988 Iran Afghanistan 2008 
Nicaragua Honduras 1988 Egypt Israel 2008 
 140 
 
Nicaragua Costa Rica 1988 Israel Egypt 2008 
Turkey Iraq 1988 Pakistan Afghanistan 2008 
Burma Thailand 1988 Venezuela Colombia 2008 
Burma China 1988 China Nepal 2008 
Burma India 1988 China Bhutan 2008 
Iran Turkey (Iraq 
Refugee) 
1988 China India 2008 
India Nepal 1989 Pakistan Iran 2008 
UK Ireland 1989 Burma Laos 2008 
Ireland UK 1989 Burma China 2008 
China USSR 1989 Burma Thailand 2008 
China India 1989 Burma Bangladesh 2008 
China Japan 1989 Burma India 2008 
China Vietnam 1989 Kosovo Albania 2008 
China Taiwan 1989 China Nepal 2008 
China Pakistan 1989 Kosovo Macedonia 2008 
China North Korea 1989 Kuwait Iraq 2008 
China Mongolia 1989 Iraq Iran 2008 
China Burma 1989 Sudan Kenya 2008 
China Laos 1989 Israel Egypt 2008 
China Nepal 1989 Iran Iraq 2008 
China Bhutan 1989 Indonesia Papua New 
Guinea 
2008 
East Germany Czechoslovakia 1989 North Korea South Korea 2008 
Peru Chile 1989 North Korea China 2008 
Peru Bolivia 1989 Malaysia Thailand 2008 
Peru Ecuador 1989 Uzbekistan Tajikistan 2008 
Romania Yugoslavia 1989 Ghana Togo 2008 
Romania Hungary 1989 Ghana Ivory Coast 2008 
Romania Bulgaria 1989 Ghana Burkina Faso 2008 
Romania Ukraine 1989 Kenya Somolia 2008-2011 
USSR Poland 1990 Egypt Israel 2009 
Nigeria Niger 1990 Iraq Iran 2009 
Nigeria Chad 1990 Iraq Kuwait 2009 
Nigeria Cameroon 1990 Iraq Saudi Arabia 2009 
Nigeria Benin 1990 Iraq Jordan 2009 
Kuwait Iraq 1990 Iraq Turkey 2009 
Kuwait Saudi Arabia 1990 Iraq Syria 2009 
Iraq Kuwait 1990-1991 Guinea Bissau Senegal 2009 
Iraq Syria 1990 Guinea Bissau Mali 2009 
Iraq Iran 1990 Guinea Bissau Sierra Leone 2009 
Iraq Jordan 1990 Guinea Bissau Liberia 2009 
Iraq Turkey 1990 Guinea Bissau Ivory Coast 2009 
Iraq Saudi Arabia 1990 North Korea South Korea 2009 
Jordan Iraq 1990 China Kyrgyzstan 2009 
Kuwait Iraq 1991-2002 India Nepal 2009-2010 
Iraq Jordan 1991 India Bhutan 2009 
Turkey Iraq 1991-1996 Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan 2009 
Slovenia Austria 1991 China Kyrgzstan 2009 
Slovenia Croatia 1991 Gabon Equitorial 
Guinea 
2009 
Togo Benin 1991 Gabon Cameroon 2009 
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Togo Ghana 1991 Gabon Republic of the 
Congo 
2009 
Togo Burkina Faso 1991 Zambia DRCongo 2009 
Turkey Iraq 1992 Niger Neighbors 2009 
Croatia Bosnia 1992 Papua New 
Guinea 
Indonesia 2009 
Ciskei South Africa 1992 Indonesia PNG 2009 
Turkey Armenia 1993-
Present 
Pakistan Afghanistan 2009 
Iraq Jordan 1993 Afghanistan Pakistan 2009 
Paraguay Argentina 1993 Iran Pakistan 2009-2010 
Paraguay Bolivia 1993 DRCongo Burundi 2009 
Paraguay Brazil 1993 Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan 2009 
Niger Nigeria 1993 Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan 2009 
Niger Mali 1993 Niger Chad 2009 
Niger Chad 1993 Niger Libya 2009 
Niger Burkina Faso 1993 Niger Algeria 2009 
Niger Algeria 1993 Niger Benin 2009 
Niger Libya 1993 Slovakia Ukraine 2009 
Niger Benin 1993 Venezula Colombia 2009 
Burundi Rwanda 1993 Malaysia Thailand 2009 
Burundi Tanzania 1993 Egypt Israel 2010 
Burundi Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
1993 Uzbekistan Afghanistan 2009-2010 
Libya Tunisia 1993 Niger Chad 2010 
Algeria Morocco 1994-2009 Niger Libya 2010 
Togo Benin 1994 Niger Algeria 2010 
Togo Ghana 1994 Niger Benin 2010 
Togo Burkina Faso 1994 Iraq Iran 2010 
Pakistan Afghanistan 1994 Iraq Kuwait 2010 
Rwanda Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
1994 Iraq Saudi Arabia 2010 
Rwanda Uganda 1994 Iraq Jordan 2010 
Rwanda Burundi 1994 Iraq Turkey 2010 
Rwanda Tanzania 1994 Iraq Syria 2010 
Argentina Chile 1994 Colombia Ecuador 2010 
Argentina Uruguay 1994 Colombia Peru 2010 
Argentina Brazil 1994 Colombia Brazil 2010 
Argentina Bolivia 1994 Colombia Venezuela 2010 
Argentina Paraguay 1994 Colombia Panama 2010 
Gambia Senegal 1994 Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan 2010-2011? 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Rwanda 1994 Chad Sudan 2003-2010 
Israel Jordan 1994 Kazakhstan Kyrgzstan 2010 
Jordan Israel 1994 DRCongo Uganda 2010 
Haiti Dominican 
Republic 
1994 Afghanistan Uzbekistan 2010 
Haiti United States 1994 Armenia Iran 2010 
United States Haiti 1994 Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan 2010 
Greece Albania 1994 Burma Thailand 2010-2011 
Thailand Cambodia 1994 Lebanon Israel 2010 
Russia Georgia 1994 Israel Lebanon 2010 
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Russia Azerbaijan 1994 Pakistan Afghanistan 2010 
Tanzania Burundi 1995 Iran Pakistan 2010 
Greece Macedonia 1994 Niger Chad 2010 
Thailand Cambodia 1995 Niger Libya 2010 
Russia Azerbaijan 1995 Niger Algeria 2010 
Liberia Ivory Coast 1995 Niger Benin 2010 
Zaire Neighboring 1995 Australia PNG 2010 
Macedonia Albania 1995 Ivory Coast Liberia 2010-2011 
Macedonia Yugoslavia 1995 Ivory Coast Guinea 2010-2011 
Macedonia Greece 1995 Ivory Coast Mali 2010-2011 
Macedonia Bulgaria 1995 Ivory Coast Burkina Faso 2010-2011 
Libya Egypt 1996 Ivory Coast Ghana 2010-2011 
Libya Tunisia 1996 Pakistan Afghanistan 2011 
Libya Algeria 1996 Israel Egypt 2011 
Libya Sudan 1996 Egypt Israel 2011 
Libya Chad 1996 Kenya Somalia 2011 
Libya Niger 1996 Thailand Malaysia 2011 
Burundi Rwanda 1996 Nigeria Benin 2011 
Burundi Tanzania 1996 Nigeria Niger 2011 
Burundi Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
1996 Nigeria Chad 2011 
Iran Iraq 1996 Nigeria Cameroon 2011 
China Hong Kong 1996 Chad Libya 2011 
Zaire Rwanda 1996 Mauritania Libya 2011 
Uganda Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
1997-2001 Algeria Libya 2011 
Thailand Cambodia 1997 Australia PNG 2011 
Turkey Iraq 1997 Syria Jordan 2011 
Sierra Leone Guinea 1997 Ethiopia Kenya 2011 
Sierra Leone Liberia 1997 Brazil Haiti 2011 
Liberia Sierra Leone 1997 Greece Albania 2011 
Solomon Islands Papua New Guinea 1997-1998 Iran Iraq 2011 
Uzbekistan Afghanistan 1998-2001 Turkey Syria 2011 
Senegal Guinea Bissau 1998 Lebanon Syria 2011 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Congo 1998 Israel Syria 2011 
Rwanda Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
1998 Jordan Syria 2011 
Israel Lebanon 1999 Iraq Syria 2011 
Paraguay Argentina 1999 Syria Turkey 2011 
Paraguay Bolivia 1999 Syria Lebanon 2011 
Paraguay Brazil 1999 Syria Israel 2011 
Macedonia Serbia 1999 Syria Jordan 2011 
Hungary Serbia 1999 Syria Iraq 2011 
Serbia Albania 1999 Iran  Pakistan 2011 
Kenya Somalia 1999 Tanzania Zambia 2011 
Burma Thailand 1999 Kenya Somalia 2011 
Guinea Bissau Senegal 1999 Pakistan Afghanistan 2011 
Guinea Bissau Mali 1999 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Congo 2011 
Guinea Bissau Sierra Leone 1999 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Rwanda 2011 
Guinea Bissau Liberia 1999 Democratic Uganda 2011 
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Republic of Congo 
Guinea Bissau Ivory Coast 1999 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Sudan 2011 
Iran Afghanistan 1998-1999 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Zambia 2011 
China North Korea 2000 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Central African 
Republic 
2011 
Israel Lebanon 2000-2001 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Tanzania 2011 
Czech Republic Slovakia 2000 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Burundi 2011 
Czech Republic Germany 2000 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Angola 2011 
Czech Republic Poland 2000 Tunisia Libya 2011 
Czech Republic Austria 2000 Libya Tunisia 2011 
Pakistan Afghanistan 2000 Iran Iraq 2011 
Guinea Mali 2000-2001 North Korea China 2011 
Guinea Liberia 2000-2001 North Korea Russia 2011 
Guinea Sierra Leone 2000-2001 North Korea South Korea 2011 
Guinea Ivory Coast 2000-2001    
Guinea Senegal 2000-2001    
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APPENDIX 2.2 
UNSTABLE GROUND: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
I conduct several robustness checks for my modeling choices presented below. These 
include dropping possible outlier targets and closers.  
 
Table 1: Directed Dyadic Test of Theories of Border Closures, Dropping Individual Closer 
Countries 
 Border Closure Presence 
 Iraq DRC Israel All Three 
Neighbor Civil War 0.275.003 
(0.093) 
0.1960.036 
(0.094) 
0.675.004 
(0.091) 
0.2150.018 
(0.091) 
Directed Income Inequality -0.053.277 
(0.049) 
-0.0090.850 
(0.0492) 
-0.070.146 
(0.048) 
-0.0220.651 
(0.048) 
Territorial Disputes 1.114<0.001 
(0.094) 
1.137<0.001 
(0.093) 
1.109<0.001 
(0.093) 
1.096<0.001 
(0.093) 
Democratic Closer/Builder- Autocratic Neighbor 1.175<.0.001 
(0.135) 
1.205<0.001 
(0.132) 
1.227<.0.001 
(0.134) 
1.215<0.001 
(0.132) 
Autocratic Closer/Builder- Democratic Neighbor 1.092<0.001 
(0.138) 
1.096<0.001 
(0.135) 
1.06<0.001 
(0.139) 
1.086<0.001 
(0.136) 
Autocratic Dyad 1.223<0.001 
(0.125) 
1.208<0.001 
(0.123) 
1.296<0.001 
(0.124) 
1.284<0.001 
(0.122) 
Log of Distance -0.0420.391 
(0.048) 
-0.0560.244 
(0.048) 
0.0070.874 
(0.049) 
-0.0140.775 
(0.048) 
Allies 0.2050.018 
(0.087) 
0.2480.004 
(0.087) 
0.2810.001 
(0.087) 
0.2610.002 
(0.085) 
Capability Ratio -0.0670.021 
(0.029) 
-0.0830.004 
(0.029) 
-0.0850.003 
(0.029) 
-0.0840.003 
(0.029) 
Constant -4.856<0.001 
(0.365) 
-4.802<0.001 
(0.363) 
-5.3310.001 
(0.370) 
-5.1210.001 
(0.362) 
Dyad Random Effects No No No No 
Dyad Fixed Effects No No No No 
N 27162 27189 27215 26757 
Notes: two-tailed p-values in italicized superscripts, standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 2: Directed Dyadic Test of Theories of Border Closures, Dropping Individual 
Target Countries 
 Border Closure Presence 
 Syria Jordan Afghanistan 
Neighbor Civil War 0.2810.002 
(0.091) 
0.268.003 
(0.091) 
0.235.011 
(0.092) 
Directed Income Inequality -0.0630.192 
(0.0482) 
-0.0480.311 
(0.048) 
-0.0580.222 
(0.048) 
Territorial Disputes 1.13<0.001 
(0.093) 
1.104<0.001 
(0.093) 
1.112<0.001 
(0.093) 
Democratic Closer/Builder- Autocratic Neighbor 1.166<0.001 
(0.132) 
1.184<0.001 
(0.134) 
1.197<0.001 
(0.132) 
Autocratic Closer/Builder- Democratic Neighbor 1.077<0.001 
(0.135) 
1.086<0.001 
(0.136) 
1.087<0.001 
(0.135) 
Autocratic Dyad 1.174<0.001 
(0.123) 
1.259<0.001 
(0.123) 
1.260<0.001 
(0.122) 
Log of Distance -0.0330.365 
(0.048) 
-0.0290.551 
(0.048) 
-0.0300.529 
(0.048) 
Allies 0.1910.026 
(0.086) 
0.2480.004 
(0.085) 
0.2930.001 
(0.086) 
Capability Ratio -0.0760.008 
(0.029) 
-0.0850.003 
(0.029) 
-0.0890.005 
(0.029) 
Constant -4.859<0.001 
(0.366) 
-5.024<0.001 
(0.363) 
-5.032<0.001 
(0.362) 
Dyad Random Effects No No No 
Dyad Fixed Effects No No No 
N 27216 27270 27249 
Notes: two-tailed p-values in italicized superscripts, standard errors in parentheses.  
 
 
